Instruct the Jury: Crane\u27s Serious Difficulty Requirement & Due Process by Gaines, Kenneth
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Law School
2004
Instruct the Jury: Crane's Serious Difficulty
Requirement & Due Process
Kenneth Gaines
University of South Carolina - Columbia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane's Serious Difficulty Requirement and Due Process, 56 S. C. L. Rev. 291 (2004).
INSTRUCT THE JURY:
CRANE'S "SERIOUS DIFFICULTY"
REQUIREMENT AND DUE PROCESS
KENNETH W. GAiNES"
I. INTRODUCTION . ............................................ 292
II. DEFINING A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR: THE EVOLUTION OF
"SERIOUS DIFFICULTY" AS AN ELEMENT OF PROOF ................. 295
A. Kansas v. Hendricks: The Beginning ........................ 295
B. Kansas v. Crane: The "Serious Difficulty" Standard ........... 296
1. Crane: The Dissenting Opinion ........................ 298
III. POST-CRANE INTERPRETATIONS: STATE COURTS AND
"SERIOUS DIFFICULTY ....................................... 299
A. State Courts Exploit the Ambiguity of Crane .................. 299
B. State Court Decisions: Specific Finding Not Required .......... 303
1. California ......................................... 303
2. Illinois ............................................ 304
3. M assachusetts ...................................... 306
4. South Carolina ...................................... 308
5. W isconsin .......................................... 310
C. State Court Decisions: Specific Finding Required ............. 311
1. M issouri ........................................... 311
2. New Jersey ......................................... 313
3. Iow a .............................................. 314
D. Crane's Ambiguity Unraveled: "Serious Difficulty" is a
Jury Question .......................................... 315
IV. "SERIOUS DIFFICULTY" INSTRUCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW .... 319
A. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Civil Case Application ........... 319
B. Theory ofDefense Instructions ............................. 319
C. "Per se Constitutional Error" Approach ..................... 321
1. Unconstitutional Shift of Burden of Proof of
"Serious Difficulty" .... .............................. 321
2. Reasonable Doubt Instructions: Never Harmless .......... 322
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; B.S. University of Kansas, 1970; J.D.
University of Kansas School of Law, 1976; LL.M. Emory University School of Law, 1990. I would
like to thank Professor Julian Cook, III, who provided very helpful advice during the preparation of this
Article. In addition, this Article greatly benefited from the student research assistance of Kaymani
West and Lakesha Jeffries. Both continued to provide immensely valuable assistance after their
graduation from law school. Special thanks are also extended to Emily Deck Harrill and the entire staff
of the South Carolina Law Review for their professionalism and excellent suggestions throughout the
editing process.
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
3. Sandstrom Burden-Shifting Instructions: An Indirect Analogy 323
D. "Serious Difficulty" Instructions and "Conditional
Constitutional Error" .... ................................ 326
1. Presumption of Innocence Instructions ................... 326
2. The Analogy for "Serious Difficulty" Instructions ........... 327
V. DILUTION OF THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT: COMPOUNDING
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS ..................................... 330
VI. PROPOSALS TO MAKE CRANE'S "SERIOUS DIFFICULTY"
REQUIREMENT W ORK ....................................... 332
A. The Ohio Approach ..................................... 332
B. Proposed Model Sexually Violent Predator Jury Instructions ..... 334
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................... 334
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1996, when states began passing Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) laws
in earnest, the cost of committing SVPs has been ever increasing. In 1998, the
estimated annual cost of committing SVPs, exclusive of new facility construction,
exceeded $5,000,000.1 According to a 1998 Washington State Institute for Public
Policy report, the State of Iowa, for example, planned to spend over one million
dollars in the first year after passage of its SVP law and over two million in the
second year for housing and treatment of six to eleven commitments.2 In addition,
Iowa expected to spend over $600,000 during the same two-year period for legal
services associated with those commitments.3 In 1998, most of the states with SVP
laws anticipated spending an average of over $90,000 per offender for housing and
treatment alone.' These amounts are all in addition to the cost of incarceration for
the original criminal sex offense. These costs will continue to escalate, because
more states have passed SVP laws, and thus will civilly commit more offenders than
the 523 in 1998.' One reason for this ever expanding number of SVP commitments
is trial courts' continued reliance on the overly broad standard for SVP
commitments set forth in Kansas v. Hendricks,6 and the refusal of trial courts to
1. See ROXANNE LIEB & SCOTT MATSON, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, SEXUAL
PREDATOR COMMITMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1998 UPDATE 10-11 tbls.12, available at
http://www.wa.gov/wsipp/crime/pdf/sexcomm 98.pdf (Sept. 1998) (providing charts containing the
numbers of committed sexual predators in states with SVP laws and the estimated costs of such
commitments). Id. at 11 tbl.2.
2. Id. Iowa enacted its SVP law in 1998. Id. at 10 tbl.l.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10-11 tbls.l-2.
5. ROXANNE LIEB & SCOTT MATSON, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, SEXUAL PREDATOR
COMMITMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1998 UPDATE 10 tbl.1, available at
http://www.wa.gov/wsipp/crime/pdf/sexconun98.pdf (Sept. 1998).
6. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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give ajury instruction on "serious difficulty in controlling behavior"7 in accordance
with the narrower commitment standard from Kansas v. Crane.! Use of the proper
Crane standard on volitional impairment arguably would reduce the number of SVP
commitments and the ensuing inpatient cost to the states.
This Article advances the position that Kansas v. Crane requires, at a
minimum, that trial courts, upon defendants' requests, instruct juries that the law
under Crane requires a finding of "serious difficulty in controlling behavior" before
the state can civilly commit a defendant as an SVP. Especially in states that
advance criminal procedural safeguards for civil SVP commitments, a trial court's
failure to give a requested "serious difficulty" instruction is a violation of the
defendant's right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.9 Alternatively, even a
state court's narrow interpretation of Crane should require that trial judges
specifically inform juries what language in the particular state SVP law implies
"serious difficulty in controlling behavior," so that jurors can tie the
constitutionally-mandated finding to the particular statutory language. Many state
courts read Crane as not requiring a separate finding of "serious difficulty,"
rendering a specific jury instruction on this issue unnecessary. Where states'
highest courts interpret Crane in this manner, the clear trend has been to hold that,
because other language within the state's SVP statute implies "serious difficulty,"
a jury instruction on "serious difficulty" is unnecessary. However, in Crane, the
Justices built upon the law of Kansas v. Hendricks"0 by adding an element to what
the government must prove, applying whatever standard of evidentiary proof the
7. "It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior." Id.
at 413.
8. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
9. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[n]o person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fifth Amendment protects individuals against the power of the federal government. See Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights limits federal
power but does not limit state power). The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" and protects
individuals against the power of state governments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Courts have generally interpreted the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments identically so that procedural due process rights enjoy the same protection in federal and
state criminal trials. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE
L.J. 1297, 1349 (1990) ("Theories concerning the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause apply, of course, in almost identical fashion to the interpretation of the same language
in the Fifth Amendment.").
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the right to a fair trial in a federal court.
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) ("We are dealing with the defendant's right to a
fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to a fair trial in a state court. See
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("And a fair trial, after all,
is what the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment above all else guarantees."); Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the "responsibility to
provide a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (opining that adoption of rules by states cannot "work [ ] a
deprivation of the prisoner's life or liberty without due process of law").
10. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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state jurisdiction employs. Like Hendricks, the Crane case originated in the State
of Kansas where the evidentiary standard is "beyond a reasonable doubt.""
At least sixteen states have enacted SVP statutes. These states delay
commitment until after completion of the defendant's sentence for a prior criminal
conviction.12
At least one commentator has noted:
While the Acts are politically popular, they carry with them
significant potential for abuse. The suspension of the, "great
safeguards which the law adopts in the punishment of crime and
the upholding ofjustice," and the use of civil commitment against
criminally responsible individuals is an assumption of power that
ought to concern us greatly.
13
Proponents of such commitments typically cite the extremely dangerous nature of
such offenders and argue that existing civil and criminal proceedings are inadequate
to address the risks these offenders present to society. Opponents assert that
treatment is not available to such offenders and, when provided, it is often
ineffective, release is infrequent, and such commitment may serve as a de facto life
sentence. Crane provides opponents an additional reason to be skeptical of post-
criminal sentence civil commitment laws for sexually violent predators. Juries do
not receive proper instructions on the correct law for involuntary commitment of
sexually violent predators under Crane. This lack of instruction denies sex
offenders constitutional guarantees of due process and fairness, because juries do
not know the required degree of volitional control for commitment. In short, under
Crane, due process and fairness demand that trial judges inform juries that they
cannot civilly commit respondents as SVPs absent a finding that respondents have
"serious difficulty" controlling their dangerous behavior.
Part II of this Article presents the development of "serious difficulty" as a
necessary element of proof in sexually violent predator commitment hearings from
Hendricks through Crane. Part III discusses various states' interpretations of the
"serious difficulty" requirement and describes the trend toward not giving "serious
11. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1994) ("The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond
a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator."). See also Crane, 534 U.S. at 416 ("that
act permits the civil detention of a person convicted of any of several enumerated sexual offenses, if
it is proven beyond reasonable doubt.").
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3713 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-.931 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1-99 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 229A.1-.16 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a15 (1994 & Supp.
2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A §§ 1-16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 253B.185 (1)-(6) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480-513 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24-.29 (Supp. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01-.23
(2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (West 2003); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 841.001-.150 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1-.16 (Supp. 2004);
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.902 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 980.01-.13 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
13. David J. Gottlieb, Preventative Detention of Sex Offenders, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1031, 1032
(2002) (quoting Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996)).
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difficulty" jury instructions. Part IV argues that, in states that have adopted the
criminal standard of proof, a trial court's failure to give a "serious difficulty" jury
instruction in SVP commitment proceedings violates the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution and Part V discusses practical reasons why a trial court's failure to
properly and explicitly instruct the jury on Crane's "serious difficulty" requirement
intrudes further upon a respondent's due process right to a fair trial. Part VI offers
the State of Ohio's SVP Act as an example of an efficient, well-intentioned SVP
commitment law that, like other states' laws, could benefit from the suggested
uniform jury instruction on the "serious difficulty" requirement of Crane.
II. DEFINING A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR: THE EVOLUTION OF "SERIOUS
DIFFICULTY" AS AN ELEMENT OF PROOF
A. Kansas v. Hendricks: The Beginning
In Kansas v. Hendricks,4 the Supreme Court set forth the substantive due
process requirements of statutes that civilly commit sexual offenders. The Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act, dating back to 1994,"s provides for the civil
commitment of a person who "has been convicted of or charged with a sexually
violent offense," and who "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence."' 6 Leroy Hendricks, the first person civilly committed under the Act, had
served a ten-year criminal sentence for taking "indecent liberties" with two thirteen-
year-old boys. 7 During his incarceration, doctors diagnosed Hendricks with
pedophilia, a mental abnormality involving a lack of control component. 8
Hendricks stated he could not "control the urge" to molest children. 9 Appealing
his commitment to the Kansas Supreme Court, Hendricks alleged, inter alia,
substantive and procedural due process violations.20 The Kansas Supreme Court, in
reversing his commitment based on the substantive due process claim, held that the
pre-commitment condition of a "mental abnormality" under the Kansas Act did not
meet the court's prior substantive due process standard of "mental illness."'"
Kansas appealed the reversal to the United States Supreme Court. The Court found
the statute sufficiently narrow to meet due process requirements, because the statute
restricted commitment to those individuals who have "[committed] past sexually
violent behavior and [have] a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of
such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated."22  The Court
concluded that a finding of dangerousness alone is an insufficient ground for civil
14. 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a15 (1995).
16. Id. § 59-29a02.
17. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
18. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
528 (4th ed. 1994) (listing as a diagnostic criterion for pedophilia that an individual have acted on or
been affected by "sexual urges" toward children).
19. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
20. Id. at 356.
21. Id. at 350.
22. Id. at 357-58.
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commitment. The additional required proof of a "mental abnormality"23 prevented
the statute from being unconstitutional, because the requisite showing limited civil
commitment to those "who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control.
24
In upholding the statute, the Court gave the states broad discretion to define
mental abnormality and to determine whether a violent sex offender who has
completed his2s prison sentence poses a continuing danger to others.26 However,
the Court provided no guidance on the degree of volitional impairment necessary
to trigger civil commitment in the SVP context.
B. Kansas v. Crane: The "Serious Difficulty" Standard
Five years after Hendricks, the Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Crane.27 In
Crane, the Court further refined the limits of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act. The Crane Court analyzed Kansas's argument that a showing of an absolute
loss of control was unnecessary under Hendricks. The Court explained the reach
of the Act as limited to those who find "it difficult if not impossible" to control their
behavior, although use of the word "difficult" indicated that the requisite lack of
control is not absolute. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that an
"[i]nsistence upon absolute lack of control would risk barring the civil commitment
of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities."' 9
The Kansas court convicted Michael Crane of kidnapping,3" attempted
aggravated sodomy, 31 attempted rape,32 lewd and lascivious behavior,33 and
sentenced him to thirty-five years to life imprisonment.34 Crane's convictions
resulted from two separate incidents, which occurred on the evening of January 6,
1993." In the first incident, giving rise to his conviction of lewd and lascivious
behavior, Crane entered a tanning salon, dropped his pants below his genitals, and
made sexual gestures with his penis toward the clerk.3 6 The second incident
occurred at a nearby video store thirty minutes after the first incident. This incident
resulted in Crane's conviction for kidnapping, attempted aggravated criminal
sodomy, and attempted rape.37 Crane attacked the video clerk, pulled his
23. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
24. Id.
25. Generic references to the male gender are for the sake of simplicity and encompass the female
gender as well.
26. "Contrary to Hendricks' assertion, ... we have never required state legislatures to adopt any
particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes. Rather, we have traditionally left to
legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance." Id. at 359.
27. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
28. Id. at 411 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358) (alteration in original).
29. Id. at412.
30. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3420 (1992).
31. See id. §§ 21-3301, 21-3506.
32. See id. §§ 21-3301, 21-3502.
33. See id. § 21-3508.
34. State v. Crane, 918 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Kan. 1996).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1259.
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sweatpants down, and exposed himself3" On at least three occasions, he ordered
her to perform oral sex and threatened to rape her.39 After both situations, Crane
fled the premises before committing any serious physical harm against his victims. 0
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Crane's conviction of lewd and
lascivious behavior for exposing himself to the tanning salon attendant.4' However,
the court reversed his convictions for attempted aggravated criminal sodomy,
attempted rape, and kidnapping.42 Kansas filed a petition seeking to adjudicate
Crane a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.
4 3
The Kansas District Court committed Crane to custody as a sexual predator, and
Crane appealed, arguing that the State failed to show he lacked volitional control.44
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Hendricks
required "'a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous
behavior'-even if. . . problems of 'emotional capacity' and not 'volitional
capacity' prove the 'source of bad behavior' warranting commitment. '4  On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Kansas "argue[d] that the Kansas
Supreme Court wrongly read Hendricks as requiring the State always to prove that
a dangerous individual is completely unable to control his behavior. '46  The
Supreme Court held that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did not require
the state to prove the offender's total or complete lack of control over his dangerous
behavior, but that ihe Federal Constitution forbids civil commitment under the Act
without any lack of control determination.47 More precisely, absent a showing that
the sex offender has serious difficulty in controlling behavior, the state cannot seek
civil commitment.48 In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized that the
impairment of self-control must be so significant as to distinguish the defendant
clearly from other dangerous recidivist offenders.49
These pronouncements clearly illustrate that the state cannot abridge a
defendant's liberty interest without first providing proof of the defendant's serious
difficulty in controlling behavior. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in Crane,
stated:
We agree with Kansas insofar as it argues that Hendricks set forth
no requirement of total or complete lack of control. Hendricks
referred to the Kansas Act as requiring a "mental abnormality" or
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. State v. Crane, 918 P.2d 1256, 1258-59 (Kan. 1996).
41. Id. at 1274.
42. Id. The state refiled the dismissed charges, except for the kidnapping charge, and Crane pled
guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of sexual battery. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286 (Kan.
2000).
43. In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 286.
44. Id. at 287.
45. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002) (quoting In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 290).
46. 1d.
47. Id. at 411-13.
48. Id. at 413.
49. Id. at 412-13. In so holding, the Court rejected the claim that a sex offender's lack of control
must be demonstrably total or complete; rather, the Court acknowledged a state's authority to commit
those sex offenders who have "serious difficulty in controlling [their] behavior." Id. at 413.
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"personality disorder" that makes it "difficult, if not impossible,
for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior."...
We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to
claim that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of
dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any
lack-of-control determination."
Justice Breyer then emphasized that Hendricks stressed that this determination
was necessary in order to maintain the distinction between sex offenders subject to
civil commitment and other criminal recidivists.5t Justice Breyer continued: "It is
enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling
behavior. "52
Bolstered by Justice Scalia's dissent in Crane," several states have seized on
the ambiguity of Justice Breyer's upholding Hendricks' commitment in Crane to
deny sex offenders facing civil commitment a jury instruction on "serious
difficulty." Although Crane examines substantive due process issues under the
same Kansas statute applicable in Hendricks, the Court clearly deals with a different
aspect of the Kansas Act not at issue in Hendricks, namely, what degree of
volitional control is necessary for civil commitment of sex offenders following
criminal sentences.
1. Crane: The Dissenting Opinion
In his Crane dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's decision was
inconsistent with the holding in Hendricks.4 He contended that the Court upheld
the Kansas statute in its entirety in Hendricks, and therefore found no reason to
reevaluate its constitutionality.55 Justice Scalia asserted that the statute as written,
without a separate control requirement, sufficiently distinguished between those
offenders subject to civil commitment and those subject to criminal liability,
because the statute required a finding of a "causal connection" between the
probability of future acts of sexual violence and the present existence of a mental
disorder.56 Justice Scalia argued that this combination of factors-a causal
connection between future acts and present existence of a mental disorder-already
assumed the "difficulty, if not impossibility" of controlling behavior and that a
separate finding by a factfinder was unnecessary. 7 Furthermore, he argued that,
because the Court narrowly interpreted Hendricks to cover only applications of the
statute to volitional control issues, the holding in Crane reopened the question of
whether emotional and cognitive impairments also fell within the scope of the
50. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-12 (2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)).
51. Id. at412.
52. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
53. See infra Part ll.B.1.
54. Crane, 534 U.S. at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 422.
56. Id. at 419-20.
57. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 419-20 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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statute.58 Scalia saw no merit in the distinction between volitional and other types
of impairments. He noted that "[i]t is obvious that a person may be able to exercise
volition and yet be unfit to turn loose upon society."59 At the conclusion of his
dissent, Justice Scalia strongly criticized the ambiguity that the Crane majority
created.6 ° Justice Scalia argued that the Court's failure to provide guidance to trial
courts in how to instruct juries in future civil commitment cases left the law in "a
state of utter indeterminacy."61 Moreover, Justice Scalia complained that the
majority's opinion required a finding of a lack of volitional control in every case,
even though the Act also provided for committing those who lack emotional
control.62 He argued that this requirement might prevent the commitment of those
dangerous sexual predators who can control their behavior: "[T]he man who has
a will of steel, but who delusionally believes that every woman he meets is inviting
crude sexual advances, is surely a dangerous sexual predator."63 Scalia's dissent
further admonished the majority for giving trial courts "not a clue" regarding how
to charge ajury in a commitment proceeding.64 Justice Scalia felt this failure would
cause nationwide confusion in those states with sex offender commitment laws.65
The dissenters, Justices Scalia and Thomas, understood that the majority
meant to add "serious difficulty" as an element that the state must prove, thereby
logically mandating a separate finding by ajury of an inability to control dangerous
behavior. Scalia wrote, "It is the italicized language in the foregoing excerpt
[referring to the 'makes it difficult if not impossible' language fromHendricks] that
today's majority relies upon as establishing the requirement of a separatefinding of
inability to control behavior."66 Justice Scalia squarely acknowledged the intent of
the majority's opinion in Crane to require a separate finding by juries of "serious
difficulty" in controlling one's dangerous behavior.67 Although he disagreed with
the holding of the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the standard Crane
imposed is the law for civil commitments of SVPs. However, the majority of states
implementing SVP laws appear to follow Scalia's dissent.
III. POST-CRANE INTERPRETATIONS: STATE COURTS AND "SERIOUS DIFFICULTY"
A. State Courts Exploit the Ambiguity of Crane
The trend of state appellate courts, with Justice Scalia's blessing, has been to
ignore Crane.68 Most state courts have maintained that their civil commitment laws
58. Id. at 421.
59. Id. at 422.
60. Id. at 424 ("Today's holding would make bad law in any circumstances. In the circumstances
under which it is pronounced, however, it both distorts our law and degrades our authority.").
61. Id. at 423-24.
62. Id. at 421-23.
63. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 422 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 423.
65. Id. at 423-24.
66. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 424 ("The State of Kansas... ask[ed] nothing more than the reaffirmation of our
5-year-old opinion--only to be told that what we said then we now unsay. There is an obvious lesson
here for state supreme courts that do not agree with our jurisprudence: ignoring it is worth a try.").
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already commit only those who lack significant volitional control because of the
nexus between the targeted disorder and the offender's acts that "necessarily and
implicitly involves proof that the person's mental disorder involves serious
difficulty for the person to control his or her behavior."69 These states concede that
Crane requires determination of some lack of control before the state can civilly
commit an offender. However, these states argue that Crane does not require a
specific jury finding that a respondent lacks volitional control, because the Court
in Crane upheld the commitment in Hendricks as constitutional despite the absence
of any specific jury determination of lack of control.7" Arizona, California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin
have all adopted this interpretation.7 These state court decisions are contrary to the
Court's determination in Crane, which required specific proof of "serious difficulty
controlling behavior."72
69. In re Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 22, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793. The Wisconsin
court further explained that "the required proof of lack of control, therefore, may be established by
evidence of the individual's mental disorder and requisite level of dangerousness, which together
distinguish a dangerous sexual offender... from a dangerous but typical recidivist." Id. at 21, 647
N.W.2d at 793. See also California v. Ghilotti, 44 P.3d 949, 971 (Cal. 2002) (explaining that the
California law "seeks to identify, combine, and treat only those volitionally impaired sex offenders
whose chances of [controlling their impulses] are sufficiently low to present a serious, well-founded
risk ofreoffense"); People v. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d 459,465 (111. App. 2002) (finding that "the fact that
respondent was proved to have repeatedly committed criminal offenses in the pursuit of his uncontrolled
sexual urges over the course of at least 25 years is sufficient to satisfy the [Crane] requirement"); In
re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Mass. 2002) (analogizing the state SVP law's requirement of a
"general lack of power to control" to the "serious difficulty" requirement from Crane).
70. See People v. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d 459, 465 (11. App. Ct. 2002) (interpreting Crane as not
requiring a specific determination of lack of volitional control, because the nature and severity of the
mental disorder distinguishes individuals subject to commitment from typical recidivists).
71. See In re Leon G., 59 P.3d 779, 788 (Ariz. 2002) (declining to require a specific instruction
under Crane, but concluding that a "serious difficulty" jury instruction was necessary to help jurors
understand the link between a mental disorder and a volitional impairment); People v. Williams, 74
P.3d 779, 792 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the statute's plain language encompasses the Crane "serious
difficulty" requirement and therefore a separate finding is not required); People v. Ghilotte, 44 P.3d
949, 971 n.12 (Cal. 2002) (interpreting the link between mental disorder and dangerousness as
satisfying Crane, because the "particular form of dangerous mental disorder, not the particular degree
of dangerousness," distinguishes individuals subject to commitment from the typical recidivist and
holding that even those sex offenders who are not more likely than not to recidivate may thus be subject
to commitment); People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 749 (Ill. 2003) (reading SVP act's definition
to imply "serious difficulty" into the act); Hancock, 771 N.E.2d at 465 ("Crane does not stand for the
proposition that in every civil commitment case a jury must make a specific determination that the
respondent lacks volitional control"); In re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d at 1064 (analogizing the state SVP law's
requirement of a "general lack ofpower to control" to the "serious difficulty" requirement from Crane);
In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the
Minnesota statute in question implicitly includes finding of "serious difficulty"); In re Treatment and
Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 144, 568 S.E.2d 338, 349 (2002) ("Inherent within the mental
abnormality prong of the Act is a lack of control determination .. "); In re Commitment of Almaguer,
117 S.W.3d 500, 505-06 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that a broad jury instruction sufficiently
encompasses statutory volitional requirement); In re Detention of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 718 (Wash.
2003) (holding that the jury does not need to make a separate "lack of control" finding); In re
Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 22, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (holding that the statute's mental
disorder and dangerousness elements encompassed the "serious difficulty" standard).
72. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,413 (2002).
[Vol. 56: 291
CRANE'S "SERIOUS DIFFICULTY" REQUIREMENT
The state court decisions also fail to distinguish Crane from Hendricks. In
Hendricks, the respondent conceded his utter inability to control his behavior.7 a
The states further ignore Crane's emphasis on the unequivocal proof in Hendricks,
"of what the 'psychiatric profession itself classifie[d] ...as a serious mental
disorder"' and that, as "a critical distinguishing feature of that 'serious... disorder'
there consisted of a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior." '74 Thus,
in Hendricks, unlike Crane, the respondent's admission established proof of
significantly impaired self-control.7 Rather than follow Crane's edict adding proof
of "serious difficulty" as some protection to ensure that each committed sex
offender lacks volitional control, these state courts appear to follow Justice Scalia's
dissent.76 Further, these state courts fail to consider and appreciate the importance
of the procedural aspect of the Court's decision to vacate and remand Crane instead
of simply reversing the Kansas court's opinion. This procedural move arguably
supports the conclusion that the Court intended to clarify, rather than just reaffirm,
Hendricks.
In contrast, a few state courts have remanded cases for trial courts to consider
whether or not offenders lacked volitional control. Like the states that follow the
Crane dissenters, these states affirm the constitutionality of their states' sex
offender commitment statutes. They hold that the preexisting "definition of 'mental
abnormality' specifically speaks of the 'degree' of the emotional or volitional
condition suffered by the offender," and "[t]he Supreme Court's requirement of
'serious difficulty' is a refinement of this term, not the addition of a new element."77
For example, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the commitment of a sex
offender and remanded the case for a new trial using an amended jury instruction
defining mental abnormality as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in
controlling his behavior."7 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded
a commitment for the trial court to determine whether or not the respondent had "a
substantial inability to control [his] conduct. 79
The Iowa Supreme Court has also recently decided an SVP commitment case
and adopted the Missouri jury instruction embodying the lack of control
requirement."0 The court explained, "By interpreting [the Iowa SVP statute] as
requiring a showing of a serious difficulty in controlling behavior, we are not
changing the statute but rather clarifying the language already in it. Because the
[trial] court's instruction did not embody this concept, we reverse and remand for
new trial."'"
73. Id. at 414.
74. Id. at 412-13 (alteration and omission in original).
75. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997); contra Crane, 534 U.S. at 410-11.
76. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 417-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Thomas v. Missouri, 74 S.W.3d 789, 791 n.1 (Mo. 2002).
78. Id. at 792.
79. In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 216 (N.J. 2002).
80. In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003).
81. Id.
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In Lee v. Florida,82 the Florida District Court of Appeal recognized "the
significance of this issue and its potential impact in numerous cases" and "the fact
that liberty interests are at stake in commitment proceedings .. ". ."" Under
Florida's court rules, the Florida District Court of Appeal certified the following
question to the Florida Supreme Court: "May an individual be committed under the
[Florida SVP commitment act] in the absence of a jury instruction that the state
must prove that the individual has serious difficulty in controlling his or her
dangerous behavior?"84 Although the Florida Supreme Court has not yet answered
this question, Judge Casanueva wrote, in a concurring opinion for the Florida
District Court of Appeal:
I interpret Crane as establishing a fourth element to the Ryce Act
cause of action-an element requiring not only proof from the
State but also jury evaluation and finding. Without a proper
instruction, the likelihood that the jury will make a
constitutionally required finding on volition will be diminished or
impaired.85
Prior to the Lee certification, the Florida Supreme Court faced the issue of a
defendant's right to a jury instruction on "serious difficulty" in the case of
Westerheide v. Florida.8 6 While four justices agreed to affirm the district court,
only three justices agreed to the opinion. Under the Florida Constitution, an opinion
is not binding precedent unless "at least four members of the Court have joined in
an opinion and decision." 7  Therefore, the majority in Lee decided "that
Westerheide does not resolve with finality the question of the sufficiency of the jury
instructions [on 'serious difficulty']."88 The Florida District Court of Appeal then
affirmed Lee's commitment because the Westerheide court upheld the commitment
and rejected the challenge to the jury instructions.89 Hence, the Florida District
Court of Appeal certified the question on sufficiency of the jury instructions
regarding "serious difficulty."9 °
The next section explores in greater detail some of the previously discussed
cases as well as state cases interpreting the Crane decision. The following
discussion illustrates the wide variation of vague language, such as "likely" and
"substantially probable," that states use to define SVPs and shows how state courts
argue that the vague language of these definitions implicitly satisfies Crane's
volitional control requirement. These state decisions fall within two categories
according to whether or not they support a specific jury finding on "serious
difficulty."
82. 854 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
83. Id. at 716.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 719 (Casanueva, J., concurring).
86. 831 So. 2d 93, 107 (Fla. 2002).
87. Lee v. Florida, 854 So. 2d 709,716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Santos v. Florida, 629
So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1994)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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B. State Court Decisions: Specific Finding Not Required
1. California
The California Sexually Violent Predator Act of 1998 defines a sexually violent
predator as:
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense
against two or more victims... and who has a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes that person a danger to the health and safety
of others in that it is likely he or she will engage in sexually
violent criminal behavior.9'
People v. Ghilotti interprets the California Sexually Violent Predator Act in
light of Crane's refinement that states must now prove that offenders have "serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.' '92 Ghilotti held that evaluators who assess the
person subject to commitment as having a diagnosed mental disorder making the
probability "likely" that he will engage in acts of sexual violence without
appropriate treatment and custody need not fred the risk of reoffense to be higher
than fifty percent.93 Instead, the court held that the word "likely" in this context
requires a determination that, as the result of a current mental disorder that
predisposes the person to commit violent sex offenses, he "presents a substantial
danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk" of reoffending in this way if not
committed.94
In reaching its conclusions, the court explained, "'likely,' when used in this
context, must be given a meaning consistent with the statute's clear overall
purpose."' '95 The court continued:
That purpose is to protect the public from that limited group of
persons who were previously convicted and imprisoned for violent
sex offenses, and whose terms of incarceration have ended, but
whose current mental disorders so impair their ability to control
their violent sexual impulses so that they do in fact present a high
risk of re-offense if they are not treated in a confined setting.96
The court determined that the term "likely" "must be construed in light of the
'difficulties inherent in predicting human behavior' particularly in mathematical
terms." 97 The court concluded the phrase "'likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence,"'98 as set forth in the Act, "connotes much more than the mere possibility
91. People v. Ghilotti, 44 P.3d 949, 959 (Cal. 2002).
92. See id. at 982 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002)).
93. Id. at 968.
94. Id. at 972.
95. Id. at 971.
96. Id.
97. People v. Ghilotti, 44 P.3d 949, 971 (Cal. 2002) (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 972 (alteration in original).
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that the person will reoffend as a result of a predisposing mental disorder that
seriously impairs volitional control."99 Ghilotti recognizes "a particular form of
dangerous mental disorder."'0 Ghilotti does not recognize "a particular degree of
dangerousness, that 'distinguish[es] a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil
commitment "from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt
with exclusively through criminal proceedings."'
' 91' 0°
California's Sexually Violent Predator Act "requires both a qualifying mental
disorder and a 'likelihood' of reoffense, and the one does not predetermine the
other."' 2 However, the statute does not require an exact finding regarding potential
for the future reoffense.'0 3 The court found that
an evaluator applying this standard must conclude that the person
is "likely" to reoffend if, because of a current mental disorder
which makes it difficult or impossible to restrain violent sexual
behavior, the person presents a substantial danger, that is, a
serious and well-founded risk, that he or she will commit such
crimes if free in the community.104
The court found this interpretation of "likely" consistent with legislative
standards that parties use to justify the civil commitment of SVPs who remain a
danger to society.'0 5
2. Illinois
In Illinois, under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), the definition
of a sexually dangerous person includes those persons suffering for more than a
year from a mental disorder, "coupled with criminal propensities to the commission
of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual
assault or acts of sexual molestation of children... " 6 Illinois also has a statute
called the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVPCA) requiring a factual
finding that the subject of the proceeding "is dangerous because he or she suffers
from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will
engage in acts of sexual violence" before the court may civilly commit such a
person under the SVPCA. 0 7 Either act provides authority for civil commitment.
The Illinois Supreme Court has construed both acts under Crane as not requiring
a jury instruction on "serious difficulty."' '
99. Id.
100. Id. at971 n.12.
101. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,412 (2002)).
102. Id.
103. See People v. Ghilotti, 44 P.3d 949, 972 (2002).
104. Id. at 972.
105. Id.
106. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/1.01 (West 2000).
107. Id. § 207/5(0 (West 2002) (emphasis added).
108. See People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 749 (1II. 2003).
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In People v. Hancock,'°9 the Illinois Supreme Court found that evidence of the
respondent's repeated criminal behavior "in the pursuit of his uncontrolled sexual
urges over the course of at least 25 years" was sufficient to satisfy the requisite
"'proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior."'. 0 Respondent argued that
Crane's holding required that a properly charged jury specifically find a lack of
volitional control before civilly committing an offender."' The Illinois court made
no such finding and ordered Hancock civilly committed." 2 The court found that
Crane does not require a specific jury determination regarding a respondent's lack
of volitional control, because the Crane Court upheld the Hendricks commitment
as constitutional despite a lack of any specific jury determination in Hendricks
regarding the control issue."' The court in Hancock recognized that Crane
highlighted the "importance of distinguishing dangerous sexual offenders subject
to civil commitment from normal criminals better dealt with through the criminal
justice system.""' 4
To the extent the holding in Hancock relies on Crane as upholding Hendricks
but not condemning Hendricks' commitment without a separate jury determination
on volitional control, the Illinois court misstates the meaning and purpose of Crane.
The court's reliance on Crane's upholding Hendricks' commitment is faulty,
because Crane did not discuss Hendricks' commitment within the purview of the
"serious difficulty in controlling behavior" standard. Rather, Crane cited Hendricks
for the principle that the state must demonstrate some degree of lack of volitional
control. "5 Use of the word "finding" in the Crane opinion suggests that the Court
would require more than mere evidence in the record; that "something more" is a
finding based on evidence produced at trial measured against an appropriate
legislative standard. Nonetheless, applying Hendricks and Crane to the facts of
Hancock, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the respondent had "serious
difficulty in controlling his behavior."".6 The court held that Hancock's diagnosis
of pedophilia, combined with evidence of his repeated criminal offenses, satisfied
the state's burden of proving that Hancock had "serious difficulty in controlling
behavior."" 7
109. 771 N.E.2d 459, 462 (11. App. Ct. 2002).
110. Id. at 465 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).
111. Id. at 463.
112. Id. at 465.
113. Id. at 465.
114. Id.
115. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) ("We do not agree with the State, however,
insofar as it seeks to claim that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous sexual
offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.").
116. People v. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d 459, 465 (IIl. App. Ct. 2002).
117. In light of Crane, the Hancock court interpreted "serious difficulty" with respect to the
features of the case, expert testimony, and the nature of Hancock's mental abnormality. The state
introduced testimony of two police officers, who reported that the respondent not only admitted
committing the underlying crimes, but also confessed to a number of other sex-related offenses over
a period of several years. Id. Respondent reported that he preferred nine- to twelve-year-old girls, and
that he had, on occasion, broken into a house, stood over the bed of a sleeping child, and masturbated.
Id. at 464. Respondent also described taking trips to look for young girls, though he never followed
through with any sexual activity with the children. Id. On one occasion, respondent kissed an eleven-
year-old girl in public and then ran away, while on another occasion, respondent broke into a house,
climbed into bed with a sixteen-year-old girl and stifled her when she started screaming. Id.
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Like Kansas and California, the Illinois statutory definition of a sexually
dangerous person does not seem to imply a need to prove a respondent's "serious
difficulty" in controlling behavior. Illinois' statute provides that the state must prove
three elements: the existence of a mental disorder for more than one year; the
existence of criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses; and the
existence of demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of
sexual molestation of children."' None of these elements suggests that the offender
has "serious difficulty in controlling behavior." Nonetheless, respondent's
argument for a specific charge on serious difficulty failed.
Crane refrained from precisely setting forth the state's burden of proof in
demonstrating serious difficulty." 9 Although Hancock purports to distinguish the
respondent from the typical recidivist, the state probably did not establish that
Hancock had "serious difficulty in controlling his behavior," because the SDPA
failed to address volitional capacity.
In a later case involving a pedophile, People v. Masterson, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that when legislative oversight causes omissions in a statute, Illinois
courts can read the missing language into the statute to the extent that their reading
does not offend the spirit and policy of the statute. 20 The court then imported the
definition of "mental disorder," from the SVPCA, which addressed volitional
capacity, into the SDPA. 2' The court, without changing its stance on Crane's
"serious difficulty" requirement, remanded the case for an additional finding on
whether "it is 'substantially probable' the person.., will engage in the commission
of sex offenses in the future if not confined."'' 22
3. Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, a "sexually dangerous person" is:
any person who has been (i) convicted of or adjudicated as a
delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a sexual
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in sexual
offenses if not confined to a secure facility; (ii) charged with a
sexual offense and was determindd to be incompetent to stand trial
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes such person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not
confined to a secure facility; or (iii) previously adjudicated as such
by a court of the commonwealth and whose misconduct in sexual
matters indicates a general lack of power to control his sexual
impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive sexual
118. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/1.01 (West 2002).
119. Whatever the proof may be, it must "distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose
serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous
but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
120. See People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 748 (111. 2003).
121. Id. at 749.
122. Id.
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misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression
against any victim under the age of 16 years, and who, as a result,
is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on such victims
because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires.123
In 1986, a Massachusetts court sentenced David Dutil to two years probation
after he pled guilty to a charge of indecent assault and battery on a child under the
age of fourteen years. 2 4 In 1987, a court sentenced him to a one-year prison term
after finding him in violation of his probation.2 Later that year, Dutil pled guilty
to four separate charges of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of
fourteen years. 2 6 In a writ of habeas corpus, Dutil challenged the constitutionality
of his civil commitment. Dutil's primary argument was that the pre-1990 version
of Massachusetts's SVP statute violated the substantive due process requirements
of both the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
because the statute's definition of a "sexually dangerous person" allowed
"commitment of an individual on a finding of dangerousness alone, without
requiring a finding that the individual's dangerousness be linked to any mental
illness or abnormality."' 27
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held the statutory requirement of a "general
lack of power to control" to be analogous to the Crane standard. ' The court found
that "[t]he statute's use of the phrase 'uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires' rather
than 'uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire' does not change this result. A mental
condition may create serious difficulty in controlling behavior even though the
individual's desires are not completely 'uncontrollable."" 29
Massachusetts takes the same approach as those states which interpret their
sexually violent predator statutes to implicitly require a finding of "serious difficulty
in controlling behavior." In reaching this conclusion, the Massachusetts court held
that an "individual's sexual desires may remain 'uncontrolled' as the result of a
mental condition even though that individual retains some measure of control over
his actions."' 3 According to the court, a statute satisfies due process concerns
because it provides for a showing that the SVP's behavior derives from a mental
condition that causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior. 3' Because the
Massachusetts statute requires such a showing, the court found no due process
violations.'
123. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 1 (West 2003).
124. In re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Mass. 2002).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1059.
128. Id. at 1064.
129. Id.
130. In re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Mass. 2002).
131. Id.
132. Id. ("The language of [the SVP statute], as we have interpreted it, clearly requires such a
showing.").
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4. South Carolina
In South Carolina, a sexually violent predator is a person who "has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense" and "suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
treatment. '
The South Carolina Supreme Court decided In re Treatment and Care of
Luckabaugh'34 six months after the Crane decision. Luckabaugh went to prison in
1996 for committing serious sex crimes on a comatose patient.'35 The state sought
his civil commitment under its SVP statute. At the non-jury hearing, three mental
health experts concluded that Luckabaugh suffered from sexual sadism, a major
mental abnormality. '36 Luckabaugh's expert disagreed with the others as to whether
Luckabaugh should receive outpatient or inpatient treatment.137 Luckabaugh
testified at the hearing, and he rejected the sadism diagnosis, although he admitted
to attempting to publish graphic stories involving themes of kidnapping, torture, and
murder. 3 ' He stated that he did not actually publish the stories, because "at some
point they got too violent and gross, even for me."' 3 9 Luckabaugh also testified that
he would not reoffend because of a his new-found spiritual beliefs. 40 The trial
court not only concluded that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that
Luckabaugh was an SVP, but also found the South Carolina Sexually Violent
Predator Act (SCSVPA) unconstitutional. 14' The state appealed. On appeal,
Luckabaugh argued, inter alia, that the SCSVPA was unconstitutional, because the
substantive due process requirements of Crane mandate a separate lack-of-control
determination before a state may involuntarily commit respondents under SVP
statutes. 142
In reaching its conclusion in Luckabaugh, the South Carolina Supreme Court
disagreed with the respondent. The court opined that Crane does not require a
separate and specially made lack-of-control determination-it requires "only that
a court must determine the individual lacks control while looking at the totality of
the evidence." 14' The South Carolina Supreme Court took the position that "[t]o
read Crane as requiring a special finding would be to suggest the United States
Supreme Court mandated at least sixteen states to hold new commitment hearings
for over 1,200 individuals committed under their state's sexually violent predator
acts."' 44 Instead, the court ruled that Crane held "the substantive due process clause
requires a court to determine an individual suffers from a mental illness which
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1)(b) (West 2002).
134. 351 S.C. 122, 568 S.E.2d 338 (2002).
135. Id. at 128-29, 568 S.E.2d at 341.
136. Id. at 129, 568 S.E.2d at 341.
137. Id. at 130, 568 S.E.2d at 341.
138. Id. at 129-30, 568 S.E.2d at 341.
139. Id. at 130, 568 S.E.2d at 341.
140. In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 130, 568 S.E.2d 338, 341 (2002).
141. Id. at 128, 568 S.E.2d at 341.
142. Id. at 142, 568 S.E.2d at 348.
143. Id. at 143, 568 S.E.2d at 348.
144. Id.
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makes it seriously difficult, though not impossible, for that person to control his
dangerous propensities."'45
The South Carolina Supreme Court takes the position that the SCSVPA
satisfies Crane, because
Inherent within the mental abnormality prong of the Act is a lack
of control determination, i.e., the individual can only be
committed if he suffers from a mental illness which he cannot
sufficiently control without the structure and care provided by a
mental health facility, rendering him likely to commit a dangerous
act.
The Act's requirements are the functional equivalent of the
requirement in Crane. The purpose of each is to ensure
involuntary commitment procedures are only used to control a
"limited subclass of dangerous persons" and not used to broadly
subject any dangerous person to what may be indefinite terms.' 4
In reluctance to rely on Luckabaugh and in response to Crane, the South
Carolina Attorney General requests a jury instruction for SVP commitment cases
that appears to comply with Crane's directive.'47
The fact that the South Carolina Attorney General has independently decided
to insert Crane's volitional control standard into its proposed request to charge
lends support to the view that the Crane Court intended to add a new element of
proof for states. This course of action also indicates that the state would rather
hedge its bet on the volitional control issue than risk the possibility of a successful
constitutional challenge to the commitment based on the trial court's failure to
follow Crane. However, this jury instruction would be less subject to constitutional
challenge under Crane if the proposed charge replaced the required finding that the
respondent's mental disorder makes him "likely to engage in acts of sexual
145. Id.
146. In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 144, 568 S.E.2d 338, 349 (2002).
147. This charge, in pertinent part, reads:
The elements which the state must prove in the case beyond a reasonable
doubt are:
1. That the respondent has been convicted of a sexually violent offense.
I charge you that [the underlying offense] is a sexually violent offense.
2. That the respondent suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that makes the respondent likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if
not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.
Inherent in these two elements the state mustprove is the requirement that
the respondent's mental abnormality or personality disorder causes him
"serious difficulty in controlling [his] behavior."
In order for you to better understand the two elements of the state's cause
of action, I am going to define for you some of the terms which I have just used:
1. "Mental abnormality" means a mental condition affecting a person's
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses. This mental abnormality orpersonality disorder must cause the
respondent serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.
2004]
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
violence," with a required finding that the disorder "causes him 'serious difficulty
in controlling his behavior."'148
5. Wisconsin
Wisconsin requires ajury determination that an individual is a sexually violent
predator to civilly commit an individual under Wisconsin's SVP Act.'4 9 The statute
defines a sexually violent predator as:
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has
been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has
been found not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent
offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect or illness,
and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will
engage in acts of sexual violence.5 °
The statute defines "mental disorder" as "a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage
in acts of sexual violence."''
In In re Commitment of Laxton,'52 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
evidence proving an SVP's predisposition to engage in future acts of sexual
violence "necessarily and implicitly includes proof that such person's mental
disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior. Such
evidence distinguishes such a person from the dangerous but typical recidivist."' 53
The court found that a nexus between an SVP's mental disorder and his level of
dangerousness established lack of control."'"
In 1987, a Wisconsin court convicted Laxton of three counts of second-degree
sexual assault and two counts of child abduction.'55 Laxton's sentence was eleven
years in prison, but he obtained parole in May 1994. 56 Five months later,
authorities arrested Laxton for window peeping at two young girls, and this incident
led to the revocation of his parole. 5 7 At his commitment hearing, experts testified
that Laxton suffered from "pedophilia, voyeurism, and/or paraphilia" and a jury
found Laxton was a sexually violent predator.' On appeal, Laxton challenged the
Wisconsin statute as unconstitutional by asserting that the statute did not sufficiently
narrow those eligible for commitment to dangerous persons readily distinguishable
148. See supra note 147.
149. In re Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 647 N.W.2d 784.
150. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (West 1998).
151. Id. § 980.01(2).
152. 2002 WI 82, 647 N.W.2d 784.
153. Id. at 2, 647 N.W.2d at 787.
154. Id.
155. Id. 3, 647 N.W.2d at 787.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. In re Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82 4, 647 N.W.2d 784, 787-88.
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from the typical recidivist. 5 9 Laxton also argued that the definitions of "mental
disorder" and "sexually violent person" in the Wisconsin statute did not have the
"requisite link to an individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior." 160
The court interpreted Crane as focusing on "the nexus between the mental
abnormality and the level of dangerousness, and whether those requirements are
sufficient to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender from the dangerous but typical
recidivist.' 6' The court held that persons will not fall within the Wisconsin SVP
statute absent a finding of a disorder that predisposed them to commit acts of sexual
violence. 62 In rationalizing that the statute's definition of dangerousness was
constitutionally sound, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Act, as written,
implicitly required proof that the respondent had "serious difficulty in controlling
his behavior."'163 Accordingly, the court found due process guarantees satisfactory,
because the state had to prove that an SVP had a volitional impairment sufficient
to justify commitment. 64  The statutory definitions of "mental disorder" and
"sexually violent person" in the Wisconsin Act require proof that the person who
the state seeks to commit had a qualifying mental condition which affected his
volitional or emotional capacity and "[made] it substantially probable that the
person [would] engage in acts of sexual violence."1 65  Because of this proof
requirement, the court held that the statutory terms necessarily implied the Crane
standard of "serious difficulty."'' 66
C. State Court Decisions: Specific Finding Required
1. Missouri
Missouri's Sexually Violent Predator Act is similar to most states' sexually
violent predator statutes. 67 The statute defines a "sexually violent predator" as a
person "who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely
than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not
confmed... .,,1 6s "Mental abnormality," the critical element of this definition, is
''a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others."' 69 The act
159. Id. 17, 647 N.W.2d at 792.
160. Id. 18, 647 N.W.2d at 792.
161. Id. 15, 647 N.W.2d at 791.
162. Id. 12, 647 N.W.2d at 790. The court went on to conclude "that the same nexus between
the mental disorder and the substantial probability that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence,
necessarily and implicitly requires proof that the person's mental disorder involves serious difficulty
for such person in controlling his or her behavior." Id. at 23, 647 N.W.2d at 793.
163. In re Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 23, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793.
164. Id. 20, 647 N.W.2d at 792.
165. Id.
166. Id. 21, 647 N.W.2d at 793.
167. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480-.513 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
168. Id. § 632.480(5).
169. Id. § 632.480(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
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also specifically enumerates the sexually violent offenses that make an individual
eligible for commitment.
71
In Thomas v. State,7 1 the Missouri Supreme Court held unconstitutional jury
instructions requiring a finding that, because of a mental abnormality, the
respondent was "more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence
if... not confined .... ,,7 In 1982, a court convicted Eddie Thomas of multiple
counts of raping and sodomizing children. 73  Prior to his release from
imprisonment, the state filed a petition to civilly commit Thomas as an SVP. After
ajury subsequently found against Thomas, the state civilly committed him. 174 The
court noted that sufficient evidence existed to warrant a finding of "serious
difficulty in controlling behavior"; but the instructions to the jury had not defined
mental abnormality in this essential way.' In reaching this conclusion, the court
held: "Both Hendricks and Crane make clear that sexual predator statutes as
enacted in Kansas and Missouri are constitutional so long as the mental abnormality
causes the individual 'serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. ,,176 The court
held that, although the jury instructions required findings that "respondent is more
likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if... not confined,"
the instructions were deficient, because they "did not require the juries to
distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose mental illness, abnormality or
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical
recidivist." '77 The Missouri court held that jury instructions defining mental
abnormality should define "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person
to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious
difficulty in controlling his behavior."' Accordingly, the Missouri Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's order for commitment and remanded the case for a new
trial.
179
170. Id. § 632.480(4).
171. Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 791-92 (Mo. 2002).
172. Id. at 790-92.
173. Id. at 790.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 792. To comply with Crane, the instruction defining mental abnormality must read
as follows:
As used in this instruction "mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual
serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.
Id. 176. Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 791 (Mo. 2002). "Accordingly, to be constitutional under
Crane, the instruction must require that the 'degree' to which the person cannot control his behavior
is 'serious difficulty."' Id. (footnotes omitted).
177. Id. at 791-92.
178. Id. at 792. Dissenters argued that "proving that defendant had a 'mental abnormality' that
makes him 'more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence' is simply one way of
proving (more than enough!) that defendant had 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior.' In short,
there is no need for a new instruction." Id. at 792-93.
179. Id. at 792.
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2. New Jersey
In New Jersey, to find a sexual offender a sexually violent predator, the state
must prove that a previously convicted individual "suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts
of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and
treatment."'s The New Jersey legislature passed its SVP Act in October 1997. The
language of New Jersey's Act is almost identical to the language of the Kansas Act
at issue in Hendricks, and the Act mimics the structure that many legislatures have
adopted."18
In In re Commitment of WZ., the New Jersey Supreme Court examined the
language of the New Jersey SVP Act to determine if the defmition of "sexually
violent predator" complied with Crane's "serious difficulty" standard.'82 W.Z.
committed a variety of sex-related criminal offenses against women between 1982
and 1994.83 When W.Z. approached the expiration of his sentence for the 1994
conviction, New Jersey filed a petition to civilly commit W.Z.84 The trial court
held that the record contained clear and convincing evidence of W.Z.'s inability to
control his dangerous sexual behavior and of the likelihood of his committing
additional sexual offenses "if not confined in a secure facility for treatment." '85
Accordingly, the trial court ordered his commitment.
186
After an affirmance of his commitment at the intermediate appellate level, W.Z.
appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court. He argued that New Jersey's "likely
to engage in acts of sexual violence" standard did not comply with the "serious
difficulty" test of Crane."7 The Act reads in part: "'Mental abnormality' means
a mental condition that affects a person's emotional, cognitive or volitional capacity
in a manner that predisposes that person to commit acts of sexual violence."' 88 The
phrase, "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence," means that "the propensity of
a person to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to
the health and safety of others."'89 The New Jersey statute therefore implicitly
imports the "serious difficulty" standard of Crane.'90
The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the legislature intended to
place some "loss of control" requirement in the Act, even though the statute does
180. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26(b) (West Supp. 2004). The state must show that the respondent
was either "convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity" of one of the
statutorily-delineated sexual offenses. See id. §§ 30:4-27.26(b), 30:4-27.26(a).
181. See In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205 (N.J. 2002).
182. Id. at 207.
183. In re Commitment of W.Z., 773 A.2d 97, 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
184. Id. at 100.
185. Id. at 104.
186. Id. at 116.
187. In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 207 (N.J. 2002).
Moreover, [W.Z.] asserts that only those sex offenders who are at risk of
specifically committing additional sexual offenses or who have a strong
demonstrable preference for sexual offenses may be included in the class of sex
offenders that a state may seek to civilly commit as a dangerous sexual predator.
Id. at 210.
188. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West Supp. 2004).
189. Id.
190. Id. In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 216 (N.J. 2002).
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not require a complete loss of control.'' The court interpreted the "serious
difficulty" standard of Crane as requiring a "substantial inability to control
conduct.' 92 This interpretation of "serious difficulty" is the part of the Act that
"links a diagnosed mental abnormality or personality disorder to the likelihood of
engaging in repeat acts of sexual violence. 1 93 The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that in New Jersey, an individual is a sexually violent predator subject to
involuntary commitment under the Act if the court finds the person, "by clear and
convincing evidence... [to have] serious difficulty in controlling his or her harmful
sexual behavior such that it is highly likely that the person will not control his or her
sexually violent behavior and will reoffend."' 94 The court remanded the case to the
trial level for a determination of "whether W.Z.'s mental condition cause[d] the
required degree of inability to control sexually violent behavior to justify his
commitment under the [Act].' 9 5
3. Iowa
The Iowa Code defines a sexually violent predator as "a person who has been
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts
constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility."' 96
Albert Barnes had several unchallenged convictions for sexually violent
offenses at the time of the trial for his civil commlitment. 19 In 2001, the State of
Iowa filed a petition alleging that Barnes was a sexually violent predator under the
Iowa Code. After a jury trial, the state confined Barnes as a sexually violent
predator in accordance with the Iowa Code. 98 Barnes challenged his commitment
on due process grounds by arguing that the trial court's jury instruction regarding
"mental abnormality"' 99 did not comply with Crane's "serious difficulty"
requirement.200 Although the trial court's instruction quoted the statute almost
verbatim, Barnes argued that Crane's due process directive required reading an
additional volitional control element into the statute.20' The Iowa Supreme Court
read Crane as clarifying the "difficult" standard of Hendricks.22 The Iowa court
held that "[t]he Crane court rejected any reading of Hendricks that would require
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 219.
195. Id.
196. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2( 11) (West Supp. 2004).
197. In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 98 (Iowa 2003). The court noted:
In 1983 he pled guilty to sexual abuse and in 1985 was convicted of two counts
of sexual abuse. He also pled guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse
on another occasion, although he denied this in the trial of the present case. In
1985 and 1996 he was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse.
Id. at 98-99.
198. Id. at 99.
199. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(5) (West Supp. 2004).
200. Barnes, 658 N.W.2d at 99.
201. Id.
202. Hendricks held that the state must prove that the respondent's control over himself is
difficult, if not impossible. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
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the state to prove total or complete lack of control to constitute a 'mental
abnormality.""'2 3 The court then reiterated the holding in Crane that "li/t is enough
to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,"2 and
agreed with Barnes that the Iowa statute's definition of "mental abnormality"
requires a showing of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.20 5 The Iowa
Supreme Court suggested that Iowa courts use the Missouri Supreme Court's
adopted jury instruction, which embodied the lack-of-control requirement of
Crane.20 6 The Iowa court noted, "By interpreting this section as requiring a
showing of a serious difficulty in controlling behavior, we are not changing the
statute but rather clarifying the language already in it."207
Like Missouri, New Jersey and Iowa have not chosen to read an implication of
"serious difficulty" into their statutes, but now mandate that trial courts give a
specific jury charge requiring that determination. The above state supreme court
decisions reflect a deliberate effort by these states to comply with Crane's
requirements by directing their trial courts to add a separate finding of "serious
difficulty in controlling behavior" to their jury instructions.
D. Crane 's-Ambiguity Unraveled: "Serious Difficulty" is a Jury Question
Because Crane did not overrule Hendricks, many states narrowly read Crane
as implicitly approving the Hendricks position that requires no separate finding as
to volitional impairment. This reading advances an unintended ambiguity on the
issue. Most state courts have not read Crane to require any additional jury
finding.2"8 These states have taken advantage of the ambiguity that Crane created
and continued employing pre-Crane no-separate-finding procedures. However,
some state courts ignore the fact that Crane did not reverse the decision of the
Kansas court, but rather vacated it. This procedural move by the Court clarified that
Crane was not a blind reaffirmation of Hendricks, but instead a clarification that
requires states to add additional due process protections beyond those that may be
implicit in their statutory definitions of mental abnormality. The Court's decision
to vacate, rather than reverse, the state court protects those sex offenders who can
exercise adequate volitional control. Notwithstanding the Court's decision, several
state courts have focused on Justice Scalia's dissent and ignored the majority's
jurisprudence in Crane. This line of reasoning suggests that judicial economy and
convenience subjugate individual liberty interests.
203. Barnes, 658 N.W.2d at 100 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002)).
204. In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (alteration in original) (citing
Crane, 534 U.S. at 411).
205. Id. at 101.
206. Id. The instruction reads: "As used in this instruction, 'mental abnormality' means a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in
controlling his behavior." Id. (citing Thomas v. Missouri, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo. 2002)).
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
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The unpublished case of In re Martinelli209 can dispell any lingering doubt
about Crane's meaning. The United States Supreme Court, after granting certiorari,
vacated the Minnesota court's opinion.2'0 The Minnesota court had relied on the
reasoning of a 1999 Minnesota Supreme Court case 21' to read into the Minnesota
statute an implicit lack of control instead of requiring proof of a lack of control as
a separate element that the state had to prove for civil commitment of an SVP.
212
The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Crane.2 1 On
reconsideration, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized that Crane requires a
specific finding of "'lack of control' based on expert testimony tying that 'lack of
control' to a properly diagnosed mental abnormality or personality disorder before
civil commitment may occur.
' 214
Similarly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded an
Illinois SVP commitment case for further consideration in light of Crane.2 5 Below,
the Illinois Supreme Court found "no need for the jury to make any additional
findings .. . regarding [the subject party's] ability to control his sexually violent
conduct." 216 However, a subsequent Illinois appellate decision recognized that
Crane requires proof that the respondent has serious difficulty controlling his
behavior, and failure to make this determination at trial results in remand to the trial
court.217 The significance of these cases is that the action of appellate courts in
vacating and remanding decisions for reconsideration in light of Crane underscores
the Court's requirement of a separate jury finding of serious difficulty in controlling
behavior. These cases also forecast how the Court will handle future cases
challenging an absence of lack of volitional control findings. The Supreme Court
ordered the Minnesota and Illinois courts to apply Crane's volitional control
standard as new law. Thus, Crane is distinguishable from Hendricks, because
Crane creates new law requiring a separate finding of lack of volitional control as
an additional element of proof from which a court or jury is to make a decision.
In her dissent in In re Commitment ofLaxton, the Chief Justice of Wisconsin
insightfully wrote that several courts appear to be following Justice Scalia's dissent
in Crane, not the majority holding, by finding implicit lack of volitional control in
their determinations.218 For seemingly self-serving reasons,2" 9 a majority of state
courts have found a way to follow Justice Scalia's dissent in Crane by ignoring and
209. In re Martinelli, No. C4-00-748, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 973 (Min. Ct. App. Sept. 12,
2000).
210. Martinelli v. Minnesota, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
211. In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
212. In re Martinelli, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 973, at *4-5 (citing In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d
at 867).
213. Martinelli, 534 U.S. at 1160.
214. In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied sub nom.
Martinelli v. Minnesota, 538 U.S. 933 (2003).
215. In re Detention of Varner, 759 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. 2001), vacatedsub nom. Varner v. Illinois,
537 U.S. 802 (2002).
216. Id. at 564.
217. People v. Gilford, 784 N.E.2d 841, 850-51 (I1. App. Ct. 2002).
218. In re Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82 34-49, 647 N.W.2d 784, 796-99
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the jury instructions were defective since they did not
direct the jury to determine that the offender lacked a degree of volitional control).
219. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
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circumventing the requirement for a separate volitional control finding. Those state
courts that champion a narrow reading of Crane deny sex offenders due process and
basic fairness under the Constitution by failing to recognize the limitation of
Hendricks to its facts, including the fact that the parties did not dispute the lack of
volitional control issue. More concisely, Justice Scalia and the state courts that seek
to take advantage of the ambiguity Crane created fail to understand, given the
relative disparity in power between states and incarcerated sex offenders, that the
Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of individual rights, has a duty to err on the side
of individual liberty and justice by applying Crane's "serious difficulty" standard
rather than promoting the state's interest in avoiding the reopening of SVP cases.
The Crane decision demonstrates the Court's desire to provide due process
safeguards in recognition of the potential for abuse of individual rights. 220 The
policy and tone of our Constitution should make denial of fundamental rights of
freedom more difficult, not easier. Justice Scalia's cause and effect formula22' for
civil commitment of sex offenders too easily permits states to deny individual
liberty.
Although Justice Breyer dissented in Hendricks on other grounds, he spent the
better portion of that dissenting opinion explaining why he supported the view that
the Due Process Clause permitted Kansas to classify Hendricks as both "mentally
ill" and a "dangerous" person for commitment purposes.222 Among his given
reasons, he stated, "Hendricks' abnormality does not consist simply of a long course
of antisocial behavior, but rather it includes a specific, serious, and highly unusual
inability to control his actions .... The law traditionally has considered this kind
of abnormality akin to insanity for purposes of confinement., 23 Justice Breyer,
recognizing that Crane's facts were different because the volitional control issue
was in play, correctly recognized the need for another safeguard to protect
individual liberty and freedom. That safeguard manifests itself in requiring that the
state prove "serious difficulty in controlling behavior" by the applicable quantum
of proof and that a court or jury make a separate finding that the sex offender has
"serious difficulty controlling his behavior" before committing him.
The unintended ambiguity that Crane created should favor individual liberty
rather than the conveniences of the government in not reexamining possibly flawed
cases. Both the majority and the dissent in Hendricks cited lack of volitional
control as the key factor to support the Court's holding the Kansas Act
constitutional. If the Hendricks holding applies only to its own facts, then Crane's
separate finding requirement makes more sense as a new element of proof. The
Crane decision embraces a sense of fairness under the Constitution, because it
separates the volitional control issue from the possible arbitrariness of states'
varying definitions of mental abnormality or personality disorder. Justice Scalia's
endorsement of Hendricks' cause and effect determination for civil commitment of
SVPs is flawed, because the Hendricks test may unconstitutionally allow
220. An earlier holding of the Court provides further support for this safeguard. See Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992) (rejecting an approach to civil commitment that would permit
the indefinite confinement "of any convicted criminal" after completion of a prison term).
221. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,419-20 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 374-76 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 375.
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commitment in cases like Crane's where proof of the volitional control component
of the mental disorder is lacking or in doubt. By adding a "serious difficulty"
finding requirement, Crane provides some measure of guarantee that the distinction
will remain between those requiring civil commitment and those deserving
treatment as recidivists through our criminal justice system. This distinction takes
on added importance given the strong potential for abuse of the civil commitment
procedure for punitive reasons rather than for treatment of alleged mental
disorders." 4
Although Justice Scalia would disagree, Crane's "serious difficulty"
requirement meets an important concern his dissent raises. Justice Scalia raised a
concern that the majority's opinion, requiring proof to a jury of "serious difficulty
in controlling behavior," might prevent commitment of "[t]he man who has a will
of steel, but who delusionally believes that every woman he meets is inviting crude
sexual advances [who] is surely a dangerous sexual predator.22 5 Here, Justice
Scalia's indifference to the volitional control standard misses the point. Crane
seeks to focus on the offender's ability to control behavior as determined by a
factfinder because of definitional incongruity of state statutes defining SVPs.
226
Justice Scalia's hypothetical man represents a man with a will of steel who states
should not commit as an SVP absent a determination that he cannot control his
dangerous behavior to the requisite degree. According to Crane, this differentiation
is important enough to warrant a separate jury determination by a factfinder.
Offenders who are able to control their dangerous behavior are "better dealt with
through the criminal justice system. '227 Therefore, Justice Scalia's hypothetical sex
offender with a will of steel accompanied by delusional tendencies would probably
not escape commitment under Justice Breyer's "serious difficulty" standard if his
behavior did not conform to the requisite degree of volitional control.
The evidence of volitional impairment was so overwhelming in Hendricks that
a jury would have had little trouble finding that he had "serious difficulty" in
controlling his dangerous behavior.228 By vacating the Kansas decision in Crane,
the Court sent a clear message that it was adding to and not simply affirming
Hendricks. Those who have read the majority opinion in Crane with approval
would likely agree that reading Crane as defeating individual liberty makes far less
sense than reading the case as protecting individual liberty. The design of SVP
laws is to commit and to treat those who do not have a "will of steel" and,
consequently, cannot control their dangerous behavior. When faced with the degree
of volitional impairment necessary to commit an SVP, the potential for
disagreement in the mental health community regarding inclusion of volitional
impairment as a diagnostic consideration, and respondent's serious liberty interest,
Justice Breyer reasoned that "serious difficulty in controlling behavior" provides the
224. One of Crane's victims stated that the prosecutor told her during the criminal prosecution
that the statute provides an "'option later down the road"' to ensure that individuals like Crane cannot
reoffend. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 2000).
225. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 421-22 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. See supra notes 196-207.
227. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
228. Id. at 375-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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constitutionally necessary measure to ensure that the line between civil commitment
and penal commitment remains clear.
The law since Crane requires a separate instruction to the jury to find either the
presence or lack of volitional control. The failure to provide such an instruction,
as Part III discusses, denies respondent's due process guarantees. While neither
Justice Thomas nor Justice Scalia denies that lack of volitional control was the
linchpin that made SVP acts constitutional,229 these Justices peculiarly take an
adamant stand against respondents' rights to have juries decide issues with such
important constitutional consequences.
IV. "SERIOUS DIFFICULTY" INSTRUCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Civil Case Application
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the appropriate standard
of review applicable to the evidence in SVP commitment cases. Only the
Wisconsin and Washington state courts have addressed the issue. In both states,
legislatures enacted the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for civil commitment
of SVPs. In In re Commitment of Curiel the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that,
while its SVP statute "is a civil proceeding . . . it shares many of the same
procedural and constitutional features present in criminal prosecutions."230 The
Washington Supreme Court likewise held that the criminal standard of proof should
apply in SVP commitment proceedings, but so held because the legislature had
already adopted the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for commitments and
therefore provided the standard for testing the sufficiency of evidence under its SVP
Act.
23 1
Nine states have approved the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for their
SVP commitment hearings. The remaining states employ either "probable cause"
or "clear and convincing" standards of proof for SVP commitments. For purposes
of the following discussion-arguing that the trial court's failure to give a jury
instruction on "serious difficulty" in civil commitment hearings is a constitutional
due process violation-applicable criminal jurisprudence serves as the analogical
basis for the arguments. Criminal adjudications and SVP civil commitments
contain many evidentiary parallels, because both types of proceedings impinge on
an individual's protected liberty interest.
B. Theory of Defense Instructions
A defense is a "set of identifiable conditions or circumstances which may
prevent a conviction for an offense., 232 In SVP cases, a Crane defense raising
reasonable doubt as to lack of volitional control may prevent commitment. In
229. See id. at 360.
230. In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697, 709 (Wis. 1999).
231. In re Detention of Thorell, 72 P.3d 703 (Wash. 2003) (citing In re Detention of Ross, 6 P.3d
625 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)).
232. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199,
203 (1982).
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criminal cases, defenses includes failure of proof, which serves to negate an element
of the alleged crime.233 Similarly, in SVP commitments, the volitional control
defense negates an element necessary for commitment. At the SVP commitment
hearing, the defendant challenges the state's proof or, through experts, puts on
evidence raising doubt as to volitional impairment in relation to the defendant's
ability to control his dangerous behavior. This defense negates the element of proof
that Crane requires before committing a defendant as an SVP. The respondent's
defense at the commitment hearing is that he has the ability to control his dangerous
behavior and, therefore, is entitled to release. Because "the prosecution must prove
the elements [for a civil commitment], it follows that the prosecution must disprove
defenses that assert the non-existence of those elements." '234 Additionally, under
criminal jurisprudence, a defendant has a right to present a complete defense. A
trial court therefore must instruct the jury on the defendant's theory of defense.
Support for this is found in the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals.
In Mathews v. United States,235 the Supreme Court stated that "[a]s a general
proposition a defendant is entitled to [a jury] instruction as to any recognized
defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his
favor." '36 Although the Mathews Court did not base its rule on the Constitution,
opinions of the courts of appeals, including the First,237 Tenth,238 and Fourth
Circuits,239 suggest that failure to give a jury instruction on the defendant's theory
of the defense may be a due process violation, notwithstanding varying evidentiary
standards. Although federal courts of appeals are apparently unanimous in holding
233. See id. at 204.
234. Id. at 259 n.224 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 48 (1972)).
235. 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
236. Id. at 63 (citing Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896)). In Mathews, the district
court convicted a federal employee for the federal crime of accepting a bribe in return for granting
government favors. Id. at 60-62. After the intermediate appellate court affirmed, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the conviction. The court found that the district court had denied the
defendant's request for an entrapment defense instruction on the erroneous grounds that the entrapment
defense is inconsistent with the defendant's denying that he committed the crime. Id. at 62. The Court
held that a defendant who denies commission of the charged crime is entitled to an entrapment
instruction if sufficient evidence supports a finding of entrapment. Id.
237. See United States v. McGill, 953 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1988)) ("'It is hornbook law that an accused is entitled to an
instruction on his theory of defense so long as the theory is a valid one and there is evidence in the
record to support it."'). In McGill, the defendant appealed a conviction for willful federal income tax
evasion on the grounds that the district court failed to give the defendant's requested instruction that
the defendant could not "be held criminally liable if in good faith he misunderstood the requirements
of [the] law, or in good faith believed that his income was not taxable." Id. (alteration in original). The
court held that the jury instruction, even if not in the specific words that the defendant requested,
adequately communicated the defendant's theory of defense. Id. at 12-13.
238. See United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.
Lofton, 776 F.2d 918,920 (10th Cir. 1985)) ("A defendant is entitled tojury instructions on any theory
of defense finding support in the evidence and the law. Failure to so instruct is reversible error.").
239. In Kornahrens v. Evatt, the Fourth Circuit explained that "if a defendant has a particular
theory of defense, he is constitutionally entitled to an instruction on that theory if the evidence supports
it." 66 F.3d 1350, 1354 (4th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit states that "[t]he right to have the jury
instructed as to the defendant's theory of the case is 'so basic to a fair trial' that failure to instruct
where there is evidence to support the instruction can never be considered harmless error." United
States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984).
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that a defendant has a constitutional right to such an instruction, the Supreme Court
has not directly addressed this situation. Therefore, if a respondent has a
constitutional right to a "serious difficulty" instruction, the right is not part of a
general right to an instruction on respondent's defense theory, but rather arises from
the unique characteristics of the "no serious difficulty" defense. While the Supreme
Court does not recognize a general constitutional right guaranteeing a jury
instruction on a viable defense theory, a denial of the instruction certainly may
violate a respondent's due process right to a fair trial. Therefore, if Crane requires
a "serious difficulty" instruction as part of the respondent's defense theory, the right
is arguably not an explicit or constitutional right, but rather, a right within the
purview of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. "Per se Constitutional Error" Approach
A trial court's failure to give the jury a "serious difficulty" instruction, where
the defendant offers some support that he has control of his behavior, may be aper
se constitutional violation subject to harmless error review. Three basic arguments
involving a trial court's failure to give ajury a "serious difficulty" instruction form
the basis for this argument: First, unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proving
"serious difficulty" to the defendant is a per se due process error. Second, "serious
difficulty" instructions are similar to reasonable doubt instructions. Lastly, "serious
difficulty" instructions are indirectly analogous to Sandstrom240 burden shifting
instructions.2"'
1. Unconstitutional Shift of Burden of Proof of "Serious Difficulty"
A trial court's failure to instruct the jury on "serious difficulty," when the
respondent so requests, shifts the burden of proof for "serious difficulty" to the
respondent and thus is per se constitutional error. This unconstitutional burden
shifting, in this unique civil context, is analogous to the Court's holding in Johnson
v. Bennett,4 2 as well as holdings from several federal courts of appeals cases that
failure of a trial court to give a criminal jury an alibi instruction unconstitutionally
shifts the burden of proving the alibi to the defendant.
243
240. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
241. See infra Part III.C.3.
242. 393 U.S. 253 (1968).
243. See United States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d
854 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Booz, 451
F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Megna, 450 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1971). In Zuniga, Hicks,
Burse, and Megna, the courts of appeals each reversed convictions due to trial courts refusing to give
alibi instructions. This failure works a hardship on the defendant, because where the jury is not aware
that the prosecution has the burden of proof as to the alibi, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.
See Zuniga, 6 F.3d at 570-71; Hicks, 748 F.2d at 857-58; Burse, 531 F.2d at 1153; Megna, 450 F.2d
at 513. In Booz, the Third Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, because the trial court refused
to give the alibi instruction that the defendant requested and instead gave the jury an ambiguous alibi
instruction followed by an overbroad instruction that confused the jury as to which party bore the
burden of proof for an alibi defense. See Booz, 451 F.2d at 723.
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In Johnson v. Bennett, the Supreme Court overturned the defendant's murder
conviction, because the trial court's jury instruction impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant in violation of the Due Process Clause.244 In the
trial court, witnesses testified in support of defendant's alibi that he was 165 miles
away from the scene of the crime at the time of the murder. 4 The trial court gave
a jury instruction stating that the defendant had the burden of proving his alibi by
a preponderance of the evidence.246 Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which the district court rejected.247 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's rejection of Johnson's petition, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the constitutional challenge to the jury instruction
on alibi.24 8 However, rather than rule on the issue, the Supreme Court vacated the
Eighth Circuit judgment because of another Eighth Circuit case prohibiting a jury
instruction requiring a defendant to prove his alibi.2 49 On remand, the Eight Circuit
reconsidered Johnson and vacated the defendant's conviction, because the
instruction was unconstitutional.250
While shifting the burden of proof by giving an erroneous instruction may
differ from shifting the burden of proof by refusing to give an instruction, the
resulting due process violation is the same. At least one court has held that a trial
court's refusal to charge on an alibi defense causes the most extreme possible
burden shift, because "'removing the issue from the jury's consideration [i]n
effect ... directs a verdict on that issue against the defendant.' 25' Just as an alibi
instruction is necessary, because it leaves no doubt as to the allocation of the burden
of proof, a jury instruction on "serious difficulty" should be necessary, because it
would leave no doubt to the state's burden of proof under Crane.
2. Reasonable Doubt Instructions: Never Harmless
"[Tihe Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. '252 This constitutional protection reflects the fact that "proof
244. Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S. 253, 254-55 (1968).
245. Id. at 253.
246. Id. at 253-54.
247. Id. at 254.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 255 (vacating for determination of case in light of Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th
Cir. 1968)). By vacating, the Supreme Court implicitly approved Stump's determination that shifting
the burden of proof of an alibi defense to the defendant is a due process violation.
250. Johnson v. Bennett, 414 F.2d 50, 57-58 (8th Cir. 1969). Lower federal courts have cited
Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S. 253 (1968), for the proposition that shifting the burden of proof for an
alibi defense to the defendant violates due process guarantees. See United States v. Robinson, 602 F.2d
760, 762 (6th Cir. 1979). State courts are in accord. See Grace v. State, 200 S.E.2d 248, 257 (Ga.
1973); Commonwealth v. French, 259 N.E.2d 195, 232 (Mass. 1970).
251. United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d 854, 858 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Strauss,
376 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1967)).
252. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In Winship, the New York Family Court found
a twelve-year-old boy delinquent based on proof the court examined under a preponderance of the
evidence standard. The New York Family Court Act dictated this evidentiary standard. See id. at 360.
Both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant's claim on appeal that a finding based on a standard less than "beyond a
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beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early year as a Nation"2 3 and
protects against "'dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life,
liberty and property.' '254 Not only must the prosecution offer proof for each
element of the alleged crime,255 but the Supreme Court also considers failure of a
trial court to give a jury a reasonable doubt instruction relating to the required
standard of proof for the charged crime to be a per se violation of due process that
is never harmless error.
25 6
Application of the Winship requirements to the "serious difficulty" instructions
is straightforward. The reasonable doubt instruction informs a criminal jury that the
state must prove each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the "serious difficulty" instruction accomplishes the same purpose. Because Crane
provides that "serious difficulty" is an element the state must prove before
comnitting a defendant," 7 and because a trial court's failure to so instruct the jury
as to the requisite burden of proof for civil commitment of SVPs is arguably a per
se constitutional error,258 a reasonable inference is that a trial court's failure to give
a "serious difficulty" instruction is a per se constitutional error.
3. Sandstrom Burden-Shifting Instructions: An Indirect Analogy
Failure to give Crane's "serious difficulty" instruction is also analogous to a
class of constitutionally flawed instructions that impermissibly shifts the burden of
proof for the mens rea element of the charged criminal offense to the defendant.259
In Sandstrom, defendant's of conviction "deliberate homicide" required proof that
he purposely or knowingly killed the victim.26 The trial court overruled the
defendant's objection to the instruction that "'[t]he law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."'2'" On appeal to the
Montana Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the instruction erroneously
shifted the burden of proof on the element of intent to him in violation of the Due
Process Clause.262 The Montana Supreme Court, affirming the conviction, found
that the instruction merely required the defendant to present "some evidence that he
did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" and, therefore, that
the instruction did not violate the Due Process Clause.263 The United States
reasonable doubt" violated his due process rights. Id. In reversing the conviction, the United States
Supreme Court held that the reasonable doubt standard of proof is a per se requirement of due process
that applies to juveniles as well as adults. Id. at 365, 368.
253. Id. at 361.
254. Id. at 362 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949)).
255. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). In Victor, the issue was whether the trial
court's instruction defining "reasonable doubt" violated the Constitution. Id. The Victor opinion began
its discussion of this issue with the statement that "[t]he government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt every element of a charged offense." Id.
256. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979) (citing Cool v. United States, 409
U.S. 100 (1972)).
257. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
258. See supra notes 176-79.
259. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1979).
260. Id. at 512.
261. Id. at 513 (quoting defendant's proposed instruction) (alteration in original).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 513-14 (quoting Montana v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (1978)).
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Supreme Court reversed the conviction.164 Holding that the erroneous instruction
was a per se constitutional error, the Court decided that a jury might interpret the
presumption265 in the instruction, in this context, in four possible ways, including
a burden-shifting inference.266 The Court also held that the instruction was
unconstitutional, because it would relieve the prosecution of proving the element
of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 267 The Court found an unconstitutional
deprivation of the defendant's due process rights, because, under Winship, the
prosecution must prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.268
While a Sandstrom instruction shifts the burden of proof in a criminal case as
to the mens rea element regarding a defendant's intent,269 failure to give a "serious
difficulty" instruction also indirectly shifts the burden of proof as to the degree of
volitional impairment necessary for commitment of an SVP. When the court does
not give a "serious difficulty" instruction, the jury may hold the respondent
responsible for proving that he can control his behavior. That understanding shifts
the burden of proof to the respondent. While the burden-shifting in a Sandstrom
instruction literally is within the text of the instruction, failure to give a "serious
difficulty" instruction implicitly shifts the burden of proof, because the jury does not
focus on the state's burden of proving the respondent's degree of volitional
impairment. The jury may therefore mistakenly assume that the respondent is
responsible for proving that he has no volitional impairment. To compound the
problem, the cause and effect language in most SVP acts that links the defendant's
mental abnormality and the likelihood of commission of future sex offenses
reinforces the possibility of burden shifting, because such language fails to inform
the jury of the state's burden of proof on volitional impairment. A Sandstrom
instruction leads the jury in a wrong direction, while failure to give a "serious
difficulty" instruction fails to provide the jury any direction. Because the trial
court's failure to give a jury Crane's "serious difficulty" instruction is analogous
to giving a Sandstrom burden-shifting instruction which violates due process, such
a refusal is arguably a due process error.
A trial court's failure to give a "serious difficulty" instruction is a per se
constitutional error, which should be subject to a harmless error analysis under
Sandstrom. Constitutional harmless error analysis traces it roots to the Supreme
Court's decision in Chapman v. California.27 ° In Chapman, the Court stated that
some constitutional errors are not severe enough to require automatic reversal. 27'
Chapman held that a constitutional error is harmless if the government proves,
264. Id. at 514.
265. "'A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action or proceeding. Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510,515 n.4 (quoting MONT. R. EVID. 301(a) (1979)). Presume means "'to suppose to be true
without proof."' Id. at 517 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 911 (1974)).
266. Id. at 514-15, 517.
267. Id. at 521.
268. Id. at 523.
269. See id. at 517.
270. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
271. Id. at22.
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beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the conviction.272
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Chapman gave examples of constitutional
violations not subject to harmless error analysis, including denial of counsel at trial,
a jury instruction containing an unconstitutional presumption, and the judge's
having a financial interest in the outcome of a trial.273 The Sandstrom Court
declined to decide whether an unconstitutional burden shifting presumption error
could ever be harmless, 274 and only after deciding Rose v. Clark,275 seven years after
Sandstrom, did the Court opine that Chapman's harmless error analysis should
apply to a Sandstrom error.276
In Rose, the defendant's conviction for second-degree murder required proof
of malice under Tennessee law.277 On habeas corpus review, the federal district
court granted the petition and deemed the jury instruction a Sandstrom error that
violated due process by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on the malice
element.278 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. However,
the court found the instruction to be more than harmless error, because the
defendant had contested the issue of malice during the trial.27 9 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for a determination of whether the instruction was
a harmless error under Chapman.2"0 The Court reasoned that "an instruction that
impermissibly shift[s] the burden of proof on malice.., is not 'so basic to a fair
trial' that it can never be harmless"28' since sufficient evidence may prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, each element of the charged offense.
One could argue that, under Rose, failure to give a jury instruction on "serious
difficulty," if an impermissible burden-shifting instruction, would be subject to
harmless error analysis under Chapman. If the state offers overwhelming evidence
from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent
had "serious difficulty" in controlling his behavior, and the respondent either does
not dispute the evidence or offers a weak reply to such evidence, then the failure to
issue a jury instruction and the indirect burden-shifting presumption that follows
272. Id. at 24. Until 1993, the Chapman harmless error rule applied to the direct review of state
and federal convictions as well as to the collateral review of habeas corpus cases. See Leslie R. Stem,
Comment, Constitutional Law--Less Onerous Harmless Error Standard Applies on Habeas Corpus
Review-Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 172, 177 (1994).
However, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Supreme Court established a different
harmless error standard for habeas corpus petitions arising from state criminal convictions; namely, the
test of whether the error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict."' Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
Thus, a federal court's granting a habeas corpus petition arising from a state criminal conviction under
Brecht became more difficult than reversing a criminal conviction on direct appeal from a state or
federal court under Chapman.
273. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 43-44 (Stewart, J., concurring).
274. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526-27 (1979).
275. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
276. Id. at 579-80.
277. Id. at 574.
278. Id. at 574-75.
279. Id. at 575.
280. Id. at 584.
281. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580 (1986) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23
(1967)).
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may be harmless.282 For example, if the state could show, as it did in Hendricks,
that direct testimony from the respondent and unchallenged expert testimony
established beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent suffers from a mental
abnormality causing him "serious difficulty" in controlling his dangerous behavior,
then, drawing on Chapman and Rose, a reviewing court might invoke a harmless
error standard of review. Thus, the respondent must zealously and vigorously
challenge the state's evidence on "serious difficulty" in order to minimize possible
application of Chapman's harmless error rule.
D. "Serious Difficulty "Instructions and "Conditional Constitutional Error"
A trial court's failure to give the jury a "serious difficulty" instruction should
be a "conditional constitutional error." To develop this argument, this section
reviews key Supreme Court decisions regarding whether the Constitution requires
a presumption of innocence instruction. Again, this requirement applies to the issue
of whether the Constitution requires a "serious difficulty" instruction via application
of a "totality of the circumstances" test. Two cases, Taylor v. Kentucky83 and
Kentucky v. Whorton,2 "4 elucidate the conditional error theory based on a totality of
the circumstances test for determining whether a trial court's refusal to give a
presumption of innocence jury instruction violates a defendant's due process rights.
This author's position is that harmless error analysis should not apply to the
determination of constitutional error by a totality of the circumstances test under a
conditional error theory. The "serious difficulty" and presumption of innocence
instructions, though somewhat analogous, are critically different. Therefore, while
the totality of the circumstances test of Kentucky v. Whorton is an appropriate
conditional error test for assessing the constitutionality of "serious difficulty"
instructions, the "per se error" approach is preferable.
1. Presumption of Innocence Instructions
A presumption of innocence lies at the foundation of the administration of the
criminal justice system.285 The law is well settled that a presumption of innocence
is an element of fundamental faimess under the Due Process Clause.286 The
Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Kentucky, found a violation of the defendant's due
process rights where the trial court failed to give the jury a presumption of
innocence instruction.8 7 In Taylor, although the trial court had instructed the jury
that a conviction required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court
stressed that giving only the reasonable doubt instruction does not alert the jury to
282. See United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d 854, 858 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Burse,
531 F.2d 1151, 1153 (2d Cir. 1976)).
283. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
284. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
285. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503 (1976) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432, 453 (1895)).
286. The government's burden of proof, which is the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, is
an application of the principle. "The [reasonable doubt] standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
287. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978).
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the need forjudging the defendant solely on admitted evidence and certainly did not
compensate for the absence of a presumption of innocence instruction.2"'
A year later, in Kentucky v. Whorton,289 the Supreme Court limited Taylor to
its facts and held that a jury instruction on the presumption of innocence is a
conditional, not absolute, requirement of the Due Process Clause.290 Whorton
established that a trial court's failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction
violates the Constitution if, in light of the "totality of the circumstances," the
defendant did not receive a fair trial.29' Subsequent cases, including Arizona v.
Fulminante292 and federal appellate cases 293 fueled confusion regarding Whorton's
"conditional error" standard as to the presumption of innocence instruction.
However, the standard remains, and courts must address Whorton when analyzing
a failure to give a "serious difficulty" instruction.
2. The Analogy for "Serious Difficulty" Instructions
The presumption of a defendant's innocence and a respondent's "no serious
difficulty" defense have analogous constitutional roles in SVP commitment
hearings that apply criminal trial standards. Four factors support the analogy. First,
the presumption of innocence and the respondent's no "serious difficulty" defense
are both constitutional rights derivative of the right to a fair trial294 under the Due
288. Id. at 484-88.
289. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
290. Id. at 789. The Court concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court did not correctly interpret
Taylor. Id. The Court remanded the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court for the application of a
"totality of the circumstances" test to determine if the trial court's failure to give a presumption of
innocence instruction deprived the defendant of his constitutional due process rights. Id. at 789-90.
On remand, the Kentucky Supreme Court, after applying the test, found no due process violation.
Whorton v. Kentucky, 585 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Ky. 1979).
291. Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789.
Under Taylor, [failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of
innocence] must be evaluated in light of the totality of the
circumstances-including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of
counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming and other relevant
factors-to determine whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial.
Id.
292. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
293. The Ninth Circuit has been inconsistent in its Whorton interpretations regarding the
constitutional implications of a trial court's failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction. In
United States v. Boyland, No. 93-10324, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3205 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1994), the
court restated the Wharton "totality of the circumstances" standard. Id. at *2 (citing Kentucky v.
Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979)). In contrast, the court, in United States v. Thornton, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24382 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1994), viewed Whorton as applying "harmless error analysis...
to [a] trial court's failure to give [a] requested 'presumption of innocence' jury instruction." Id. at *2
(citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979)). Adding to the confusion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cited Fulminante for the list of constitutional errors,
including a trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, to which harmless
error analysis applies. See Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Johnson, 71 F.3d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 1995) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
294. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503 (1976) ("The right to a fair trial is a fundamental
liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The presumption of innocence, although not articulated
in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.") (citation
omitted).
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Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.295 Second, both the
presumption of innocence and a no "serious difficulty" defense relate to the
requirement of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof. A criminal
defendant's presumed innocence is sufficient to acquit him unless and until the
state's production of evidence convinces a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty.2 96 Similarly, a respondent's "no serious difficulty" defense is
sufficient to avoid commitment until the state's proof otherwise convinces a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent lacks the degree of volitional control
that Crane contemplated. Third, both a presumption of innocence instruction and
a "serious difficulty" instruction direct the jury's attention to jury responsibilities
that a reasonable doubt instruction do not make obvious. A presumption of
innocence instruction makes the jury aware of its duty to assess guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt solely on facts the court admitted into evidence and not on
extrinsic facts that come to the jury's attention.297 In a like manner, a "serious
difficulty" instruction makes the jury aware of its duty to assess the no "serious
difficulty" defense in terms of the state's burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable
doubt and not on the respondent's burden to prove it.298 Fourth, both a presumption
of innocence instruction and a "serious difficulty" instruction respond to factors in
a trial which are extrinsic to the instruction. A presumption of innocence
instruction counteracts the effect of the presentation of non-evidentiary facts to the
jury.299 In parallel fashion, a "serious difficulty" instruction negates any inclination
that the jury might have to require the respondent to prove the truth of a "no serious
difficulty" defense.3"0
However, the analogy is not perfect, as the presumption of innocence defense
contains important distinctions from the "serious difficulty" defense. The
presumption of innocence defense relates to the jury's frame of mind regarding the
defendant's innocence but does not relate specifically to the elements of the charged
offense.30' On the other hand, a "no serious difficulty" defense pertains to a specific
element that is a prerequisite for commitment. Because of the relationship of the
"no serious difficulty" defense to an element of what the state must to prove for
commitment, failure to give the "no serious difficulty" instruction directly impacts
the burden of proof for that element. This failure can devastate a defendant who
relies primarily on a "no serious difficulty" defense to avoid commitment. Failure
to give the presumption of innocence instruction, on the other hand, does not
negatively impact the respondent in as singular a manner as does a failure to give
295. See supra note 9.
296. "[E]very person is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ..
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
297. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) ("This Court has declared that one
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the
evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody,
or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.").
298. See Robinson, supra note 232, at 204, 208,259 n.224 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN
W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 48 (1972)), for the proposition that the state has the
burden of disproving the defendant's alibi. By analogy, the state has the burden of disproving the
defendant's lack of serious difficulty defense.
299. See supra note 294.
300. See Robinson, supra note 232.
301. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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a "no serious difficulty" instruction. Therefore, failure to give the presumption of
innocence instruction lacks the particularized effect on the case that failure to give
a "no serious difficulty" instruction may have. To the extent that "serious
difficulty" instructions are analogous to presumption of innocence instructions, a
trial court's failure to give the jury a "serious difficulty" instruction is a due process
error that should be subject to a test consistent with the rule in Whorton.30 2
Accordingly, the appropriate test under this analysis is that a trial court's failure to
give a requested "no serious difficulty" instruction is a due process constitutional
error if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the respondent did not receive
a fair trial.
If the court's failure to give a "no serious difficulty" instruction is a
constitutional error based on the results of a totality of the circumstances test, then
a harmless error test is unnecessary. This rule is consistent with Taylor,"3 where
the court reversed the defendant's conviction, without a harmless error test, by
applying a totality of the circumstances test to the trial court's failure to give the
jury a presumption of innocence instruction. Consequently, if the respondent
establishes that failure to give the "no serious difficulty" instruction deprived him
of a fair trial, then the error could not have been harmless, because the state will not
be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict.
After weighing both the "per se error" and the "conditional error" approaches
regarding a trial court's failure to give an alibi instruction, the "per se error"
approach supports a due process violation regarding a failure to give a "no serious
difficulty" charge for three reasons. First, failure to give the instruction
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the respondent. Second, the
instruction is analogous to the reasonable doubt instruction, and failure to give a
reasonable doubt instruction is a per se due process error. Third, the instructions
are indirectly analogous to the Sandstrom burden-shifting instructions. Admittedly,
the analogy to Sandstrom is not perfect, because lack of volitional control
instructions relate to the state's burden of proving facts extrinsic to the instruction,
while Sandstrom instructions relate to defects in the instructions themselves.
In contrast, the "conditional error" approach is dependent on an imperfect
analogy between "no serious difficulty" instructions and presumption of innocence
instructions. An important imperfection in the analogy is that failure to give a "no
serious difficulty" instruction may devastate a defendant who is relying on the "no
serious difficulty" defense to avoid commitment, while failure to give a presumption
of innocence instruction is not as likely to have such a direct effect on the outcome
of the trial. Additionally, a "conditional error" approach imports the risk that a trial
302. Id. at 789.
303. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
304. The Whorton opinion, which never discussed harmless error, stated that the "totality of the
circumstances" test arose from the Taylor Court's holding that the trial court's refusal to give a
presumption of innocence instruction violated Taylor's due process rights. Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789.
In fact, the Taylor Court reversed the defendant's conviction on grounds of constitutional error without
applying harmless error analysis. The implication is that the Whorton Court viewed the "totality of
circumstances" test as requiring reversal, without a Chapman harmless error inquiry, when the test
determines that a court's failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction is a due process error.
By analogy, a harmless error test is unnecessary when a "totality of the circumstances" test determines
that failure to give a "no serious difficulty" instruction is a constitutional error.
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judge may incorrectly assess the totality of the circumstances when deciding not to
give a "no serious difficulty" instruction. This possibility leads to a heightened
burden on appeal, because the respondent bears the burden of proving that the trial
judge erred.3 °5
The conditional error approach also provides an opportunity for judges to
construe vague statutory language in SVP statutes such as "substantially probable,"
to implicitly mean "no serious difficulty." A "per se error" approach reduces this
risk of denying the respondent a fair trial, because the trial judge must give the
instruction, and if the judge fails to give the instruction, the state must to meet the
strict standards of a harmless error test in order to avoid reversal of the defendant's
commitment. °6
Because the failure to give a jury instruction on Crane's required standard for
lack of volitional control is analogous to other types of jury instructions, the
omissions of which constitute per se constitutional due process violations subject
to harmless error review, the law favors a similar constitutional violation when the
trial court fails to give an instruction on "serious difficulty in controlling behavior."
V. DILUTION OF THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT: COMPOUNDING DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
Empirical studies demonstrate that juries generally have difficulty
understanding court instructions. 7 Many jury instructions contain too much
legalese and promote a disconnect of meaning between legal professionals and lay
juries08 so much so that juries sometimes render verdicts that are incorrect under
305. Consider this idea in the context of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under
a "conditional error" theory, the test for constitutional error determines, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, whether the defendant received a fair trial. This framework is equivalent to a test of
whether a "no serious difficulty" instruction would have affected the verdict. In Strickland, a convicted
defendant in a capital punishment case alleged a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claim during the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court held the contested conduct of the defendant's
counsel subject to a conditional error test which requires the defendant to "show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different," id. at 694, or "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial." Id. at 687. The Court viewed the capital sentencing hearing as indistinguishable from
an ordinary trial. Id. Therefore, under Strickland, if a defendant alleges a constitutional error during
the trial, where the alleged error is subject to a "conditional error" test for constitutionality, the
defendant has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that a constitutional error occurred.
306. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding the test for harmless error requires
the beneficiary of the constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the conviction).
307. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 37, 41-44 (1993). "Much research by linguists, psychologists and others has confirmed that
jurors tend to have great difficulty understanding the instructions that are supposed to guide their
decisionmaking." Id. at 42. See also Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand
Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401 (1990) (reporting the results of an empirical study of whether jurors
understand jury instructions). For the following true/false statement, less than 35 percent of the
participants gave correct answers after hearing instructions on reasonable doubt: "A reasonable doubt
must be based only on the evidence that was presented in the courtroom, not on any conclusion that you
draw from the evidence." Id. at 414.
308. See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure
to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REv. 77, 100 (1988).
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the law.3°9 Justice Scalia roundly criticized the majority in Crane for providing trial
courts with "not a clue" as to how to charge ajury.310 He suggested that "[framing]
for ajury the degree of 'inability to control' which, in the particular case, 'the nature
of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality' require"
maybe impossible.3 ' His critique of the majority ignores the fact that imprecision
plagues many, if not all, jury charges. Even after the judge provides instructions,
jurors often do not understand the law. For example, over 500 subjects in a
Michigan study displayed a low level of comprehension of jury instructions on
reasonable doubt.312 Often, trial judges pick and choose from various cases,
instructions, which define the "reason of doubt" phrase differently. Justice Scalia
is not alone in his criticism of the Crane standard. Some authors complain that the
standard suffers from a lack of objective criteria,313 or a lack of an "appropriate
legal construct that could serve as a neutral benchmark for judges and juries in
making this determination."3 4 Comparatively speaking, the "serious difficulty"
standard that Crane announced is no better and no worse than many other standards
that the Court has devised.
The trial judge has a duty in every case to tell jurors what law governs the
particular cause of action. Crane instructs that the state must prove the respondent
has "serious difficulty" in controlling his behavior in order to subject him to civil
commitment. The jury's duty is to apply the law to the facts of the case. The facts
that establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the respondent has a mental
abnormality or defect that may cause him to commit future serious sex offenses
have no legal validity without Crane's explicit standard on volitional control to aid
the jury's determination.
If trial judges may refrain from giving the jury an explicit Crane instruction,
respondents will have difficulty raising reasonable doubt in response to the state's
evidence in relation to that legal standard. Where judges do not offer explicit
charges on the lack of volitional control, respondents lose the benefits of tying any
reasonable doubt found in the state's evidence to the Crane requirements, because
the jury will never hear the judge mention "serious difficulty" in connection with
the respondent's dangerous behavior. The result is to deprive respondents of the
fundamental right to a fair trial.
States with sexually violent predator laws should have uniform proposed
instructions that explicitly incorporate Crane's "serious difficulty" standard in
relation to a respondent's dangerous behavior. Such instructions would ensure
compliance with Crane and eliminate the problem of appeals courts being unable
to determine with any degree of certainty the legal standard juries apply in reaching
309. Id. at 94.
310. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423 (2002).
311. Id.
312. See Kramer & Koenig, supra note 307.
313. Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility: The Constitutional
Boundaries of Civil Commitment After Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 117, 141 (1999). See
also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (discussing insanity); Robert F. Schopp & Barbara J.
Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal Mental Illness for Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 437,
446-47 (1995) (discussing incompetence).
314. Georgia Smith Hamilton, The Blurry Line Between "Mad" and "Bad": Is "Lack of
Control " a Workable Standardfor Sexually Violent Predators?, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 481,503 (2002).
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their verdicts of commitment. State appellate courts following a narrow reading of
Crane must examine the record for facts indicating "serious difficulty" in implicit
rather than explicit terms. This "implicit" definition is unacceptable when the
respondent's freedom is at stake, and the possibility of application of this
unfortunate precedent to other areas of criminal justice jurisprudence is unsettling.
Implicitly reading Crane's "serious difficulty" standard into state sexually violent
predator laws, as several state courts have done, seriously undermines the appellate
function and conflicts with Crane's requirements.
VI. PROPOSALS TO MAKE CRANE'S "SERIOUS DIFFICULTY" REQUIREMENT WORK
When the Supreme Court decided Hendricks in 1997, seventeen states had laws
"that [sought] to protect the public from mentally abnormal, sexually dangerous
individuals through civil commitment or other mandatory treatment programs." '315
Ten of those states begin treatment of an offender soon after his arrest and charge
with a serious sex offense. Only seven delay civil commitment and treatment until
the offender has served his criminal sentence. 316 However, of these seven states, six
require consideration of less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment.
17
Minnesota and New Jersey delay commitment, but do not delay treatment. Only
Iowa, which delays both civil commitment and treatment until after completion of
the criminal sentence, does not consider less restrictive alternatives .3 Although the
focus of state legislatures on treatment of SVPs at the earliest possible time is
laudable, most of these states still do not incorporate Crane's "serious difficulty in
controlling behavior" standard in the SVP determination.
A. The Ohio Approach
Opponents of SVP laws often fault the procedural posture of civil commitment
hearings. At the initial sentencing, instead of authorizing treatment for offenders
readily distinguishable from the typical recidivist, most states wait until the
completion of the criminal sentence to initiate what is, in essence, another trial on
the same offense, albeit for a different purpose. While the commitment hearings do
not violate ex post facto laws because they are civil in nature, these hearings require
additional court time, additional expert testimony, additional preparation, and, most
important, additional funding to litigate the issues the parties could have litigated
at the criminal trial.
Ohio's approach to the SVP problem is a good example of a procedural process
for commitment of sexually violent predators that takes into account the
respondent's rights and the time and financial demands on court systems. Although
Ohio's commitment hearings for sexually violent predators are civil, Ohio organizes
315. Hendricks v. Kansas, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (1997).
316. Id.
317. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3702 (West 2003); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6607-6608
(West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185(1) (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.28 (West
Supp. 2004); WASHl. REV. CODEANN. § 71.09.090 (West Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.06(2)(b)
(West Supp. 1998).
318. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 388.
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its sexually violent predators statute under its criminal code,3" 9 and the standard of
proof in determining whether an offender is a sexually violent predator is "beyond
a reasonable doubt." 2' A review of Ohio's system reveals that the placement of the
statute reduces court time and expenses for commitments. The Ohio SVP Act also
defines the commitment process as criminal, not civil. Ohio adjudicates offenders
as sexually violent predators before the initiation of the criminal trial.32' Placement
of this determination at the beginning of the offender's sentence suggests that the
purpose of Ohio's Act is to provide treatment for these offenders.
The Ohio classification provision requires a determination of whether the sex
offender falls into one of three categories: sexually-oriented offender; habitual sex
offender; or sexual predator.322 If a court convicts a person of committing a
sexually violent, sexually-oriented offense and of a sexually violent predator
specification, "the conviction of the ... specification automatically classifies the
offender as a sexual predator .... "323 The Ohio trial court then holds a hearing
prior to sentencing to determine whether the sexually-oriented offender is a sexual
predator.
24
Before a trial judge can declare the sex offender a sexual predator, the statute
requires the establishment of several factors, including, but not limited to, the
offender's age, prior record, the age and number of victims, and the offender's
behavioral characteristics.3 25 The only instance not requiring a sexual predator pre-
sentencing hearing occurs when a "sexually violent predator" specification attaches
to a sexually violent offense in the indictment. 26 In this instance, the sexual
predator label attaches automatically.
327
Ohio's approach makes procedural sense in terms of financial, as well as
judicial, economy, because the SVP determination occurs at the same time as the
criminal trial. However, the question remains whether Ohio's statute needs
adjustment to include Crane's "serious difficulty" requirement, and, if the offender
does not have the opportunity to request a jury trial on an SVP determination,
whether the trial judge should have to make separate written findings on the issue
of volitional impairment before issuing an SVP ruling. If Ohio adopted and applied
Crane's. volitional control standard in all SVP commitment determinations, Ohio
would be a much better example of how the ideal functioning of the SVP
commitment process. However, until respondents assert due process challenges to
force states to conform to Crane's volitional control standard as a predicate to an
SVP commitment, Ohio and other non-conforming states will not likely change
their positions.
319. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 29.50.01-99 (Anderson 2003).
320. State v. Jones, 754 N.E.2d 1252 (Ohio 2001).
321. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.09(B)(1)(a) (Anderson 2003).
322. Id. § 2950.01.
323. Id. § 2950.09(A).
324. Id. § 2950.09(B)(1)(a).
325. Id. §§ 2950.09(B)(3)(a)-j).
326. Id. § 2950.09(B)(5).
327. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2950.09(C)(1) (Anderson 2003).
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B. Proposed Model Sexually Violent Predator Jury Instructions
Judge Casanueva, in a concurring opinion in Lee v. Florida, wrote, "I would
respectfully suggest that a standard jury instruction consistent with Crane should
be generated and used in future jury trials."32 While sexually violent predators are
among some of the most dangerous types of criminals, they too deserve adequate
protection of Constitutional rights. Specifically, sexually violent predators do not
deserve deprivation of due process rights at the hands of trial judges who fail to
implement Crane's edict on "serious difficulty." Notwithstanding the complaints
of Justices Scalia and Thomas, given the constitutional implications and the
possibility of lifetime confinement as a result of civil commitment under SVP laws,
attorney John Donham, Crane's counsel, has advanced the following jury
instructions, based on Crane's "serious difficulty" standard.3 29  Perhaps these
instructions will satisfy Crane critics and shore up some of its perceived
imperfections.
The proposed instruction reads:
* To find Respondent to be a "sexually violent predator," you
must find his disorder causes him to have serious difficulty in
controlling his dangerous behavior.
" "Serious difficulty in controlling behavior" means "difficult
if not impossible to control dangerous behavior."
" "Serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior" is a
degree of self-control impairment that readily distinguishes
Respondent from ordinary violent sex offenders who are
likely to re-offend.
" "Behavior" means acting in a certain way. It does not simply
mean "urge" or "attraction" or "desire. 33°
This instruction offers specific, direct guidance for a factfinder by providing a
definition of "serious difficulty in controlling behavior." Implementing this
instruction would bring uniformity and consistency to this area and would be an
important step on the road to compliance with the Court's directive in Crane.
VII. CONCLUSION
Crane limits the state's police and parens patriae powers33' to civilly commit
sex offenders under sexually violent predator acts. Although the contours of the
standard may be imprecise, the Court explicitly established "serious difficulty" as
the degree of volitional impairment states must prove to the satisfaction of a jury
328. Lee v. Florida, 854 So. 2d 709, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Casanueva, J., concurring).
329. Donham represented Michael Crane. Although Donham submitted the proposed instructions
to the Kansas Judiciary Council, that body has not adopted the proposal as part of Kansas's pattern
instructions.
330. John Donham, Model Jury Instructions on Crane's "Serious Difficulty" Standard (on file
with author).
331. See Falk, supra note 313, at 124.
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before courts can commit sex offenders who have completed their criminal
sentences. Notwithstanding Hendricks, the court in Crane, underscores the inability
to control dangerous behavior as a critical element of proof and as the feature
distinguishing those persons subject to involuntary commitment from ordinary
dangerous recidivists. The omission of a jury instruction on this element denies
respondents their fundamental due process right to a fair trial. Failure to instruct the
jury on this standard is analogous to depriving these respondents of similar rights
in the criminal arena. Justice Scalia's dissent notwithstanding, Crane clearly
requires such a charge before the civil commitment of an SVP. The requirements
of individual liberty in this country far outweigh the burdens and costs to society.
The failure to instruct juries regarding whether the respondent has serious
difficulty in volitional control is a per se constitutional error subject to harmless
error review. The state must bear the burden of proof for each element required for
commitment. Crane places this burden squarely on the state and does not allow a
shift of the burden to the respondent. As a consequence of the trial court's failure
to instruct a jury on "serious difficulty," the jury is not informed of the legal
standard by which it is to measure the respondent's dangerous behavior. This
potential error involves major due process implications. Although holding SVP
commitment hearings contemporaneous with criminal trials enhances judicial
economy and the treatment goals of the commitment process, Crane's volitional
control standard must govern these SVP commitment proceedings in order to make
the commitments constitutional.
Finally, for the sake of uniformity and consistency in applying the "serious
difficulty" standard, states that conduct civil commitment hearings should adopt
uniform jury instructions. Even if a state desires to follow Justice Scalia's Crane
dissent, providing for a specific jury finding on the issue of the respondent's ability
to control his behavior would still be beneficial.332
Such a finding might satisfy the constitutional concerns in Crane.
Because [a Florida SVA Act] case places an individual's personal
freedom and liberty at risk for an infmite term, . . . both the
Constitution and logic mandate that the courts must ensure that
the jury or factfinder specifically addresses this essential element
of lack of volitional control.333
332. See Lee, 854 So.2d at 719.
333. Id.
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